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Of Public Funds and Public Participation: 
Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority 
to Reimburse Public Participants 
in Administrative Proceedings 
Carl W. Tobias* 
A number of federal agencies have recently relied upon implied power to 
reimburse expenses incurred by public participants in administrative proceed-
ings.1 When the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attempted to exercise this authority, 
their efforts were challenged by parties who, relying on a purportedly control-
ling decision of the Second Circuit, 2 contended that participant funding was 
an impermissible exercise of administrative power. The USDA initiative was 
upheld in district court,3 but the FDA program was invalidated by a divided 
Fourth Circuit panel.4 
The dispute over agency reimbursement has not been confined to the 
courts. Explicit and strong differences of opinion over citizen compensation 
have also arisen in the legislative and executive branches of government. 
Because the question of whether agencies have implied power to fund remains 
a compelling and unresolved issue, it is an appropriate time to analyze this 
complex problem. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana. Legal consultant, Food and Drug 
Administration. B.A. 1968, Duke University; LL.B. 1972, University of Virginia. The author 
wishes to thank Professor Bari R. Burke, Dean Richard A. Merrill of the University of Virginia 
Law School, Professor Thomas P. Huff, William A. Rossbach, Roy A. Schotland, and Harvey J. 
Shulman for their suggestions, and James McKenna and Allan McGarvey for valuable research 
assistance made possible by the Harris Trust. The views expressed in this Article are not necessar-
ily those of the FDA. 
1. The terms "reimbursement," "compensation," and "funding" are used interchangeably 
in this Article to mean the voluntary payment from agency resources for fees and expenses 
incurred by public participants in agency proceedings. "Authority" and "power" also are used 
synonomously. "Implied authority" is used in a very general sense to describe the source of 
agency power to make such payments. However, the authority is not "implied" in the sense that 
power to incorporate a bank was implied in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819), from express powers to tax, borrow money, and regulate commerce, by way of the 
necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. Congress has granted modern-day agencies 
broad express substantive authority to regulate in the public interest, and has included in their 
mandates general residuary clauses instructing agencies to do everything necessary to achieve that 
goal, as well as residuary spending clauses instructing agencies to spend for all necessary expenses. 
Thus, what was drawn by implication in McCulloch is expressly granted these agencies. The 
question that has fueled the participant-funding debate, and that this Article attempts to resolve, 
is the scope of this delegated authority, for while the residuary power is expressly granted, it does 
not specifically address participant compensation. 
2. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1086 (1978). 
3. Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
4. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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The first section of this Article is an historical survey of the developments 
that have led to the extant disagreement in the judiciary, Congress, and the 
agencies. In the next section, the cases treating participant reimbursement are 
assessed, and thereafter a comprehensive analysis of the legal principles raised 
by the exercise of implied compensation authority is presented. The Article 
concludes with an evaluation of the performance of the funding programs to 
date and the implications of this experience for implied reimbursement power. 
I. SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTICIPANT REIMBURSEMENT 
Many of the developments that led to disagreement within the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches over the question of agency funding au-
thority occurred during the "Reformation of American Administrative 
Law" 5 that has taken place in the last twenty years. These events may best be 
examined by defining the problem that participant compensation was intended 
to meet, by reviewing the origins of the concept of reimbursement, and by 
surveying executive and legislative treatment of participant funding generally 
and the authority issue specifically. 
A. Definition of the Problem 
Congress, in creating many administrative agencies, intended that they 
regulate private behavior in the public interest. 6 The agencies exercise consid-
erable discretion, and decisionmaking has become a fundamentally legislative 
process in which regulators must ascertain and balance the competing conten-
tions of the various private entities affected by administrative action. 7 Satis-
factory performance of these tasks has been undermined, however, by the 
significant disparity of participation in agency proceedings between commer-
cial and noncommercial interests. 8 Industrial concerns have a substantial 
stake in agency decisionmaking, and "generally possess the high degree of 
involvement, the economic strength, and the organizational cohesion required 
to present their views to the agencies consistently and coherently." 9 By 
5. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms and Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393 
(1981); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 
(1975). 
6. For exemplary statutes, see 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) (DOT); 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(l) (1976) 
(CPSC). For discussions of the meaning of the term "public interest," see Gellhorn, Public 
Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 360 (1972); Lazarus & Onek, The 
Regulators and the People, 57 Va. L. Rev. 1069, 1077 (1971). 
7. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1682-84, 1711-15. 
8. This problem has been explored comprehensively in Cramton, The Why, Where and How 
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 Geo. L.J. 525 (1972); 
Gellhorn, supra note 6; Stewart, supra note 5. Imbalance in participation, however, is only one of 
many theories propounded to explain administrative decisionmaking that seems biased toward 
industry. See generally Crampton, supra, at 527-30; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1681-89, 1713-15; 
Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1815-17 
(1975). 
9. Note, supra note 8, at 1816. 
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contrast, those that might oppose positions of regulated parties generally are 
diffused, and individually have a rather insignificant interest in the outcome 
of any single proceeding.10 While administrative determinations may have 
considerable collective impact on them, 11 substantial transactions costs and 
free-rider effects make problematic their organization for the purpose of 
influencing agency choices on a continuing basis. 12 
When nonindustry interests do not participate, administrative officials 
cannot ascertain their views on issues of fact, law, or policy. Moreover, the 
pervasive presence of regulated parties virtually ensures that the extra-agency 
input upon which decisionmakers do rely in reaching determinations comes 
almost exclusively from one source. Because input is provided predominantly 
by commercial interests, it is not surprising that administrative choices reflect 
industry perspectives. The imbalance in participation fundamentally under-
mines not only the appearance of fairness in agency decisionmaking but also 
its substance. 
In response to these and other considerations, officials in each branch of 
government have taken action during the last fifteen years designed to expand 
the opportunities for public involvement. Courts have required that members 
of the public affected by agency determinations be permitted to participate in 
administrative proceedings, and that decisionmakers accord "adequate con-
sideration" to their views.13 Since the mid-1960's, Congress has provided for 
citizen involvement in a number of specific areas.14 The executive branch also 
has been active, with Presidents Ford and Carter strongly endorsing, and even 
promoting, expanded public participation,15 and with numerous agencies in-
creasing possibilities for citizen involvement.16 By 1975, as a result of judi-
cial, legislative, and administrative action, public participation in agency 
proceedings had become an accepted norm of the administrative process. 
Merely creating the legal opportunity for citizen involvement, however, 
was insufficient. Proponents realized that the "single greatest obstacle to 
active public participation in regulatory proceedings" was the lack of finan-
10. See Cramton, supra note 8, at 529. 
11. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1715. 
12. See id. at 1686, 1714-15; Cramton, supra note 8, at 529. 
13. In the landmark case of Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. 
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the agency's 
decision to prohibit "intervention on behalf of the public [that] would have vindicated the broad 
public interest relating to a licensee's performance of the public trust inherent in every license." 
Id. at 1006; see also National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For 
comprehensive treatment of this trend, see Gellhorn, supra note 6; Stewart, supra note S, at 
1748-60. 
14. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976) (Forest Service, USDA); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976) 
(FTC). 
15. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 42,761 (1976); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 
(1978); Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President Carter, 
May 16, 1979, 1 Public Papers of the President, Jimmy Carter, 1979, at 867. 
16. "In order to comply with the mandate of decisions like Church of Christ, most federal 
agencies have expanded the scope of their intervention procedures." Note, supra note 8, at 
1817-18 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1981) (FCC); 21 C.F.R. §§ 12.40, 12.45 
(1981) (FDA). 
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cial resources available to meet the considerable costs of involvement.17 If 
citizen participation could improve the quality of agency decisionmaking, it 
seemed advisable to facilitate involvement by providing financial assist-
ance.18 The idea of participant funding was developed to address these 
concerns. 
B. Origins of the Concept of Participant Reimbursement 
The first serious consideration accorded by a governmental entity to the 
idea of participant compensation appears to have occurred at the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States during the late 1960's.19 The Conference 
recommended 20 that agencies "pay the personal expenses and wage losses 
incurred by [indigent] individuals incident to their participation in rulemaking 
hearings." 21 It urged Congress to appropriate funds for this purpose and 
suggested that agencies with existing authority financially support public in-
volvement. 
During 1969, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considered the idea 
of compensation for indigent respondents in its unfair practice hearings. 22 
Thereafter, the Commission sought the opinion of the Comptroller General 
on agency authority to reimburse expenses incurred by both impecunious 
respondents and indigent intervenors. The Comptroller responded affirma-
17. 3 Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Study on Federal 
Regulation: Public Participation in Regulatory Agency Proceedings vii (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Public Participation Study]. Indeed, as early as 1966, even as Judge Burger was fashioning the 
right of public participation, he recognized that the staggering "expense of participation in the 
administrative process" would "operate to limit the number of those who will seek participa-
tion." Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 
(D.C. Cir. 1966). For cost estimates, see Public Participation Study, supra, at 17-22; Cramton, 
supra note 8, at 538; Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 389-96. 
18. See, e.g., Public Participation Study, supra note 17, at chs. 1, 2 & 7; Public Participation 
in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977, Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 270 Hearings]; Public Participation in Federal Agency 
Proceedings: Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Proce-
dure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. 
2715 Hearings]. 
19. Congress created the Administrative Conference in 1964 and set out its most important 
powers and duties in 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1976). The Conference is to "study the efficiency, adequacy, 
and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in carrying out 
administrative programs, and make recommendations to administrative agencies, collectively or 
individually, and to the President, Congress or the Judicial Conference of the United States, in 
connection therewith, as it considers appropriate." Id. 
20. These recommendations were based on a study of representation of the poor in federal 
rulemaking, conducted for the Conference by Professor Bonfield. See Recommendations Sug-
gested to the Administrative Conference of the United States on the ·Basis of the Study of 
Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking I(b)(6}, reprinted in Bonfield, Representation 
of the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 511, 556 (1969). The recommendations were 
only a nascent form of the reimbursement concept. 
21. Administrative Conf. of the United States, Representation of the Poor in Agency 
Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them, in 1 Administrative Conf. of the United States, 
Recommendations and Reports, 1968-1970, at 71 (1970) (recommendation No. 5). 
22. American Chinchilla Corp., 76 F.T.C. 1016, 1037-38 (1969). 
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tively, stating that such expenditure "would constitute a proper exercise of 
administrative discretion." 23 
By the early 1970's, considerable scholarly attention had been devoted to 
participant funding.24 In 1971, however, the Administrative Conference re-
considered citizen compensation in the context of a study examining public 
participation in agency hearings. While the Conference affirmed the impor-
tance of citizen involvement, it rejected a recommendation endorsing the idea 
of administrative reimbursement.25 
C. Implementation of the Reimbursement Concept 
The concept of participant compensation did not receive intensive gov-
ernment consideration until the mid-1970's. A survey of developments there-
after reveals both that agency funding has aroused great interest and that it 
has been accorded a mixed political and administrative reception. Funding 
programs have been implemented at the direction of Congress under grants of 
specific statutory authority and on the initiative of the agencies themselves 
pursuant to implied powers. Neither Congress nor the agencies, however, 
seem to have fixed ideas about the desirability, scope, or implementation of 
administrative reimbursement programs. Examination of the administrative, 
executive, and legislative activity provides a useful perspective for evaluating 
judicial treatment of prior and potential challenges to compensation and for 
predicting future developments in this unsettled area of administrative law. 
1. Administrative and Executive Action on Participant Reimbursement. 
Many federal agencies have exhibited interest in compensating members of the 
public participating in the decisionmaking process.26 In 1974, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, later to become the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), was first to announce that it would conduct rulemaking proceedings 
on reimbursement27 and commissioned an independent study of the subject.28 
Informal rulemaking was commenced in 1975,29 but was terminated in the 
following year when the agency decided against initiating a funding pro-
23. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman, 
FTC (Aug. 10, 1972) (reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 281). 
24. See Cramton, supra note 8, at 543-45; Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 394-97; Lazarus & 
Onek, supra note 6, at 1098-1103. 
25. Administrative Conf. of the United States, Public Participation in Administrative Pro· 
ceedings, in 2 Administrative Conf. of the United States, Recommendations and Reports, 1970-
1972, at 39-40 (1971) (recommendation No. 28). 
26. In 1972, preceding the period of brisk agency interest in participant funding, the Federal 
Trade Commission invoked its implied authority to fund one intervenor. See Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 1032 (1972). 
27. The rulemaking was in response to a number of requests for financial assistance from 
intervenors in nuclear licensing proceedings. See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976). 
28. See Boasberg, Hewes, Klores & Kass, Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 
Policy Issues Raised by Intervenor Requests for Financial Assistance in NRC Proceedings 13 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as NRC Report], reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 331, 
332. The study contract specifically excluded consideration of the agency's statutory authority to 
fund. Id. at 14. This exclusion may perhaps be explained by the fact that the Commission had 
decided to seek an opinion regarding its compensation power from the Comptroller General. 
29. 40 Fed. Reg. 37,056 (1975). 
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gram. 30 The Commission questioned its authority to extend financial assist-
ance and concluded that the compensation issue could be resolved more 
appropriately by Congress than by the individual agencies with their "neces-
sarily restricted perspectives and mandates." 31 In 1980, the NRC again 
expressed interest in funding public participants, inquiring of the Comptroller 
General about an appropriations committee proscription of reimbursement. 32 
Between 1976 and 1980, numerous agencies and departments, acting 
pursuant to implied authority, initiated compensation rulemaking, promul-
gated funding regulations, established pilot programs, and reimbursed partici-
pants. In 1976, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a 
rule providing limited procedural assistance for indigent intervenors, 33 and the 
FDA issued advance notice of proposed rulemaking on compensation. 34 
During the next year, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) established a twelve-
month demonstration effort for participant funding. 35 Advance notices of 
proposed rulemaking were issued by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) 36 and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),37 and proposed regulations 
were published by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 38 and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the De-
partment of Commerce. 39 Even the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), which as the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had previously 
opposed the efforts of intervenors to secure agency funding, modified its 
views. 40 The NOAA 41 and the CPSC42 established reimbursement programs 
in the spring of 1978, while the CAB issued its final regulations in Decem-
ber. 43 These agencies appear to have relied on opinions of the Comptroller 
General supporting their assertion of implied spending authority. 44 
30. See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976). 
31. Id. at 50,831. The Commission also stated that its decision to abandon the funding idea 
rested on policy considerations as well as on reservations as to the scope of its authority. Id. at 
50,829. 
32. Letter from Leonard Bickwit, Jr., General Counsel, NRC, to Elmer B. Staats, Comp-
troller General (Nov. 2, 1979). Congress, apparently reacting to a favorable response by the 
Comptroller, inserted an explicit prohibition of reimbursement in the NRC's 1980 appropriation 
measure, see infra notes 60 & 83 and accompanying text. 
33. 41 Fed. Reg. 53,019 (1976). The regulation was in response to a petition of the Federal 
Communications Bar Association. Id. 
34. 41 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1976). 
35. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2863 (1977). The second part of the preamble to the regulation creating 
the pilot effort was an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that invited public comment on the 
advisability of establishing reimbursement on a "department wide and permanent basis." Id. at 
2864. 
36. 42 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1977). 
37. 42 Fed. Reg. 8663 (1977). 
38. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,711 (1977). 
39. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,711 (1977). 
40. Brief for the FERC on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Greene County Planning Bd. 
v. FERC, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,806 (1978). 
42. 43 Fed. Reg. 23,560 (1978). The CPSC rule was termed an interim regulation, and the 
program created was in the nature of a pilot effort. Id. 
43. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,878 (1978). The proposed regulation appeared earlier at 43 Fed. Reg. 
14,044 (1978). The FCC also published a Notice of Inquiry that year. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,834 (1978). 
44. See the preambles accompanying the regulations cited supra notes 41 & 43. 
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In 1979, President Carter circulated a memorandum urging the heads of 
all departments and agencies to institute compensation efforts.45 The 
USDA 46 and the National Telecommunication and Information Administra-
tion of the Department of Commerce47 issued notices of proposed rulemak-
ing, and the FDA promulgated its final compensation regulations. 48 The 
Department of Energy (DOE), however, suspended consideration of an un-
published reimbursement proposal pending legislative approval after Congress 
proscribed expenditure of FERC appropriations on citizen funding. 49 In 
1980, the USDA finalized its rule creating a funding program, and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) instituted a demonstration project 
financially to assist qualified persons in commenting on proposed department 
regulations. 50 Those agencies funding under implied authority discontinued 
their programs in 1982, influenced by the adverse political climate and by 
doubts about the scope of their power. 51 
2. Opinions of the Comptroller General and the Office of Legal Counsel. 
Government legal opinion has supported agency efforts to establish partici-
pant reimbursement programs and has been relied upon by the agencies. The 
Comptroller General 52 has been a consistent and forceful proponent of this 
exercise of power. In 1976, the Comptroller issued four opinions reaffirming 
the position on implied funding authority initially articulated in the 1972 FTC 
45. Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President Carter, 
supra note 15. 
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 17,507 (1979), relying on rationale advanced by the Comptroller General. 
Id. at 17,508. 
47. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,743 (1979), relying on rationale advanced by the Comptroller General. 
Id. at 70, 744. 
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 59,173 (1979). The proposed FDA regulations appeared earlier at 44 Fed. 
Reg. 23,044 (1979) and also demonstrate reliance on the opinions of the Comptroller. Id. at 
23,046. 
49. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65,278 (1979). Section 103 of the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Act of 1980 provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated for Department of 
Energy activities by this Act shall be used to pay expenses of, or otherwise compensate, parties 
intervening in regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings funded in this Act." Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 
Stat. 437, 441 (1979). 
50. 45 Fed. Reg. 6020 (1980) (USDA); 47 Fed. Reg. 29, 678 (1982) (NHTSA); 45 Fed. Reg. 
83,171 (1980) (HHS). The Department of Housing and Urban Development also became inter· 
ested in participant funding in 1980 and issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking. 45 Fed. 
Reg. 14,068 (1980). However, it was subsequently instructed by Congress that it was not to spend 
for reimbursement, see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
51. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9820 & 9861 (1982) (NOAA); 47 Fed. Reg. 12,789 (1982) (CPSC); 47 
Fed. Reg. 12,951 (1982) (FDA); 47 Fed. Reg. 22,071 (1982) (USDA). The FDA was precluded 
from funding by Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981). The other 
agencies also adverted to this case in explaining their decisions to discontinue their programs. 
52. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), an 
independent agency within the legislative branch created as a fiscal watchdog of the agencies. 
Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
349 (1970); Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain Parity of 
Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1279, 1280-83 (1973). The preeminent work on the 
GAO and the Comptroller General is still H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General (1939). There is 
also a valuable new study, F. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest For Accountability In American 
Government (1979). Congress has authorized the Comptroller General to render decisions respect· 
ing the power of agencies to disburse funds. For further discussion of the Comptroller's author· 
ity, see infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. 
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ruling. 53 Two of these decisions were responses to requests of the NRC and 
the FDA, then engaged in reimbursement rulemaking; 54 the others were trig-
gered by congressional inquiry. 55 In the four opinions, the Comptroller 
stated that ten agencies-the FTC, the NRC, the FPC, the FDA, the BP A, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the CPSC, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the FCC, and the NHTSA-possess compensation au-
thority. 56 He reasoned that Congress vests these agencies with responsibility 
for protecting the public interest57 through administrative decisionmaking and 
annually appropriates to each agency funds "[f]or necessary expenses, not 
otherwise provided for." 58 If public involvement is necessary to assist the 
agencies in decisionmaking, authority to compensate citizen participants can 
be implied from the substantive statutory mandates and residuary appropria-
tion provisions. The Comptroller stated that this power could be exercised if 
an agency believed (1) that it could not make a required determination without 
reimbursing interested parties whose participation was necessary for disposi-
tion of the matter under consideration and (2) that these entities would 
otherwise be unable to finance their involvement. 59 
The Comptroller supplemented these rulings on agency funding authority 
in a 1980 opinion for the NRC.60 Although the House committee report 
accompanying the Commission's 1980 appropriations act stated that no 
money was to be paid to intervenors, the Comptroller found that the NRC still 
might legally reimburse participants that year and that only an explicit statu-
tory provision could bar citizen compensation. The Comptroller also declared 
that the Greene County decision, 61 in which the Second Circuit had ruled that 
the FPC lacked funding authority, was not binding on other agencies and 
reiterated his earlier opinion that agencies possess reimbursement power. 
53. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra notes 27-31 & 48 and accompanying text. The rulings were included in Letter 
from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to NRC (Feb. 19, 1976), reprinted in S. 270 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 418 [hereinafter cited as Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC], and Letter 
from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to FDA (Dec. 3, 1976), reprinted in id. at 455 
[hereinafter cited as Letter from R.F. Keller to FDA]. 
55. Letter from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman, 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
(May 10, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Keller to Moss], reprinted in S. 270 Hearings, 
supra note 18, at 428; Letter from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. Yvonne 
Brathwaite Burke, Congressional Black Caucus (Sept. 22, 1976), reprinted in id. at 439. 
56. See Letter from Keller to Moss, supra note 55. 
57. See, e.g., examples cited supra note 6. 
58. See, e.g., Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1981, Pub. 
L. No. 96-400, 94 Stat. 1681, 1683 (1980) (FAA appropriation). 
59. Letter from Keller to Moss, supra note 55. The Comptroller later modified the first 
criterion, saying that 
[i]t would be sufficient if an agency determines that such participation "can reasonably 
be expected to contribute substantially to a fair determination of" the issues before it, 
even though the expenditure may not be "essential" in the sense that the issues cannot be 
decided without such participation. 
Letter from R.F. Keller, to FDA, supra note 54. 
60. Decision of the Comptroller General, No. B-92288 (Jan. 25, 1980). 
61. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978). 
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The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department also agreed 
that agencies have funding authority. The Department of Transportation 
asked the OLC whether its power to compensate intervenors was circum-
scribed by Greene County. 62 The OLC responded that the Greene County 
holding was limited to funding authority under the Federal Power Act63 and 
that DOT was "required to interpret its own organic statute and any other 
relevant statutory provisions," 64 to determine whether Congress had granted 
it reimbursement power. 
The OLC opinion troubled ranking members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, who requested that then-Attorney General Bell review the Of-
fice's opinion. 65 The Attorney General concurred with the OLC's conclu-
sion, 66 but the senators' inquiry illustrates recurrent congressional reserve on 
the issue of participant funding. 
3. The Legislative Response. Throughout this period, when departments 
and agencies were formulating their positions on reimbursement and initiating 
compensation programs, Congress assumed a comparatively passive posture, 
responding rather erratically to the administrative initiatives. The legislature 
provided for participant funding by some agencies in substantive statutes 
while barring reimbursement by other agencies in appropriations acts. In 
appropriations committee reports, Congress instructed a number of agencies 
not to compensate, but also indicated that its failure to grant specific author-
ity should not be interpreted as expressing an opinion that agencies lack 
power. The legislative branch has neither approved nor disapproved proposals 
that would either prescribe or proscribe funding by all federal agencies. While 
a trend is evident-apparent congressional receptivity to participant reim-
bursement in the middle seventies replaced by a growing disenchantment with 
the concept-ambiguity and lack of permanent direction probably best char-
acterize the legislative approach to the reimbursement concept. 
Congress initially addressed citizen compensation in 1974 during consid-
eration of the Energy Reorganization Act. 67 In explaining deletion of a 
Senate amendment that would have given the NRC specific reimbursement 
authority, the conference committee stated that its failure to enact legislation 
providing the agency with specific power did not mean that the Commission 
62. Letter from Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, DOT, to John Harmon, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 27, 1977). 
63. Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
Dep't of Justice, to Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, DOT (Mar. 1, 1978). 
64. Id. at 3. 
65. Letter from Senator Eastland, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senator 
Thurmond, ranking minority member, to Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General (Mar. 17, 1978). 
Letters from Senators Allen, Bartlett, H. Byrd, Curtis, Domenici, Garn, Helms, Laxalt, and 
McClure evinced similar concerns. 
66. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General, to Senator Eastland (June 14, 1978). 
67. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified in scattered sections of 5 & 42 U.S.C.). As 
early as 1972, Congress had included a form of participant compensation in the Consumer 
Product Safety Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2)(1976). 
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lacked funding authority. 68 Congressional receptivity to funding became 
more pronounced in the succeeding years, as the legislature in 1975 empow-
ered the FTC to compensate participants in rulemakings under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act,69 and in 1976 granted the EPA similar authority under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act. 10 
In 1977, congressional treatment of funding became more ambivalent. 
The legislative branch specifically authorized citizen reimbursement in Depart-
ment of State proceedings.71 Moreover, the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs, in a comprehensive study of federal regulation, acknowledged 
that several agencies had instituted compensation efforts, specifically ap-
proved of them, and recommended that other agencies implement their own 
programs pending enactment of general funding legislation. 72 The same year, 
however, the House Appropriations Committee report for fiscal 1978 govern-
ing agricultural and related agencies-including USDA, FDA, and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission-prohibited them from spending any 
money on participant reimbursement. 73 
The inconsistency in the congressional approach heightened in 1978. 
Congress enacted legislation specifically authorizing participant compensation 
by FERC,74 but in legislative history proscribed expenditure of appropriated 
funds for that purpose. 75 Money was explicitly provided for implementation 
of demonstration projects by the CAB and DOT, 76 but the Economic Regula-
tory Administration of the Department of Energy and the NRC were prohib-
ited from reimbursing citizen-participants.77 Finally, while the House appro-
priations bill would have again proscribed compensation by the agricultural 
agencies, the proviso was deleted by the conference committee, which ac-
knowledged that the agencies might undertake funding efforts.78 
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Ad. News 5470, 5550-51. 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976). The implementing regulation is at 16 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1981). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4) (1976). The EPA issued a temporary rule implementing the 
statutory provision in November, 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 60,911 (1977). See generally infra note 
82. 
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2692 (Supp. III 1979). See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 37,785 (1978). 
72. See Public Participation Study, supra note 17, at 118-19. 
73. H.R. Rep. No. 384, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. 96-97 (1977). However, the report does not 
state that the proscription was imposed because the committee believed that the agencies lacked 
implied reimbursement authority. 
74. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825q-l (Supp. III 1979). 
75. The prohibition appeared in the two committee reports. H.R. Rep. No. 1247, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978); S. Rep. No. 1069, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1978). 
76. The DOT received $125,000 and the CAB $150,000. H.R. Rep. No. 1329, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 10, 13 (1978). 
77. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. 
No. 95-465, 92 Stat. 1295 (Economic Regulatory Administration); H.R. Rep. No. 1490, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978); S. Rep. No. 1069, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978) (NRC). The 
Economic Regulatory Administration proscription, which was originally contained in the House 
bill but deleted in the Senate version, was restored in conference. H.R. Rep. No. 1672, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978). 
78. For a discussion of these legislative machinations, see 44 Fed. Reg. 23,044-45 (1979). 
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Beginning in 1979, congressional opposition to the reimbursement con-
cept became more pronounced. The legislature again prohibited the Economic 
Regulatory Administration from compensating citizens and imposed similar 
constraints on the other components of DOE. 79 Moreover, the conference 
committees responsible for NRC, NHTSA, and CAB appropriations in-
structed those agencies that no funds were to be paid public intervenors.80 
The House Appropriations Committee, however, acquiesced in the continuing 
USDA and FDA reimbursement efforts. 81 
Extensive funding prohibitions were enacted in 1980. The appropriations 
legislation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
"sundry independent agencies, boards [and] commissions" including CPSC 
and EP A;82 NRC; most components of the Department of Energy;83 the 
Economic Regulatory Administration84 and all transportation agencies 85 pro-
scribed the use of government money to support nonfederal regulatory inter-
vention. Inclusion of the spending prohibitions in the appropriation statutes 
themselves, rather than in the committee reports as in 1979, may have re-
flected congressional reaction to the Comptroller General's opinion that the 
79. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 972; Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-69, § 103, 93 Stat. 437, 441. 
80. H.R. Rep. No. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess 1 (1979), incorporating by reference H.R. Rep. 
No. 243, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1979) (NRC); H.R. Rep. No. 610, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14 
(1979) (NHTSA/CAB). The House Appropriations Committee in its report had deleted the 
participant reimbursement funding for the NHTSA and the CAB, remarking that the "committee 
believe[d] that NHTSA [could] develop a full record upon which to base informed decisions in the 
public interest without the existence of a separate Federally financed public participation pro-
gram," but giving no reason for deleting funds for the CAB. H.R. Rep. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 35, 54 (1979). The Senate Appropriations Committee disagreed and restored appropriations 
for both agencies. S. Rep. No. 377, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 49 (1979). The conferees agreed 
without explanation to delete the funds. 
81. H.R. Rep. No. 242, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1979). The report summarized USDA's 
funding program, warned that it would be scrutinized by Congress, and urged other committees 
to consider the compensation issue. 
82. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropria-
tions Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-526, § 410, 94 Stat. 3044, 3065. Due to an apparent mixup with 
respect to the EPA's plans for expending funds on reimbursement-with the result that some 
members of the House believed that agency officials had not told them the truth-the House 
proscribed compensation by all of the agencies whose appropriations were grouped with that of 
EPA. See H. Rep. No. 1114, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1980). The Senate Appropriations 
Committee recommended that funds be provided for reimbursement in certain situations, S. Rep. 
No. 926, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19 (1980), but the Senate bill was amended on the floor so that 
it closely paralleled the House prohibition. See 126 Cong. Rec. S13084 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980), 
Senator Danforth, who offered the amendment, stated that its "purpose .•. is to make clear that 
no implied authority to create intervenor funding programs is recognized." Id. 
83 . Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-367, § 502, 
94 Stat. 1331, 1345 (proscribing reimbursement by NRC, DOE, and FERC). Some representatives 
had expressed the view that intervenors contributed little to agency proceedings. See Hearings on 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1981 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and 
Water Development of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 4, at 181-84, 
196-203 (1980). 
84. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 96-514, 94 Stat. 2957, 2976. 
85. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. 
L. No. 96-400, § 316, 94 Stat. 1681, 1697. Included were the ICC, CAB, and NHTSA. 
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committee reports lacked prescriptive effect. 86 Constraints were also imposed 
upon FTC participant compensation. 87 By contrast, a Senate floor amend-
ment that would have prohibited reimbursement by the agricultural agencies 
failed.88 Moreover, Congress enacted legislation providing for the award of 
fees and expenses to prevailing parties in adversary adjudicatory proceedings 
before administrative agencies, unless the agency position was substantially 
justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust.89 In 1981 
Congress again used the appropriations process to proscribe funding, impos-
ing restrictions virtually identical to those in 1980. 90 
During this period, Congress had many opportunities to adopt a compre-
hensive policy on agency compensation. In 197591 and 1977,92 Senator Ken-
nedy introduced legislation that would have specifically authorized reimburse-
ment by most agencies, and similar bills were offered in the House. 93 The 
regulatory reform packages introduced in both Houses in 1979 also included 
general funding provisions.94 By contrast, the House Judiciary Committee 
approved a provision of the proposed Regulatory Reform Act of 1980 pro-
scribing agency compensation unless specifically authorized by law. 95 The 
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
87. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § IO, 94 
Stat. 374, 377-78. The restrictions reflect longstanding controversies over management of the 
FTC reimbursement program. See S. Rep. No. 184, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1980); S. Rep. No. 
500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1980). 
88. 126 Cong. Rec. Sl5,092, Sl5,096 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1980). Senator Armstrong, who 
offered the amendment, had stated that USDA lacked statutory authority to spend for participant 
funding. Id. at Sl5,093-94. 
89. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2321, 
2325-2330 (1980). See generally Dods & Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. 
Rev. 48 (1981). 
90. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropria-
tions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-101, 95 Stat. 1437 (1981) (HUD); Department of Transporta-
tion and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-102, § 315, 95 Stat. 1442, 
1460 (1981) (transportation agencies); Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-88, § 502, 95 Stat. 1135, 1148 (1981) (NRC/DOE/FERC). In addition, Congress 
eliminated the CPSC offeror program, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976), though the Commission was 
permitted to continue reimbursing participants contributing to formulation of agency standards, 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1202, 95 Stat. 357, 703-04 
(1981). The agricultural agencies and the Department of Commerce were not instructed on 
participant funding. 
91. S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
92. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18. 
93. E.g., H.R. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see 
Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.R. 3361 and Related Bills Before the 
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3361 Hearings]. 
94. See, e.g., H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 
755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform 
Hearings on S. 104, S. 262, S. 299, S. 755 & S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice 
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as S. 104 Hearings]. Measures specifically directed toward comprehensive 
administrative reimbursement authority were introduced as well in the House. E.g., H.R. 284, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2596, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
95. H.R. Rep. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 56 (1980). 
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Senate Governmental Affairs Committee voted out a similar measure in 
1981.96 None of the proposed regulatory reform legislation has been enacted. 
Thus, congressional action on agency reimbursement remains a patch-
work quilt. Neither broadly approving nor disapproving the funding concept, 
and indeed without addressing explicitly the organic compensation authority 
of agencies, the legislative branch has repeatedly relied upon the annual 
appropriations process to express an ambiguous and contradictory policy.97 
Against this backdrop, several courts have ruled on the validity of implied 
agency reimbursement authority. 
II. PARTICIPANT REIMBURSEMENT AND THE COURTS 
In contrast to the considerable involvement of the executive and legisla-
tive branches in the funding issue, few administrative-reimbursement cases 
have reached the courts. The paucity of litigation is probably attributable to 
the unsettled state of the compensation concept and the uncertain status of 
many agency programs. If participant reimbursement were to become a more 
institutionalized administrative concept, judges might be asked to accord 
increased consideration to the theoretical and practical problems involved. 
Despite the currently limited judicial involvement, however, courts deciding 
the cases reported to date98 treat the fundamental issues of statutory interpre-
tation and interaction among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
as central to the funding debate, and thus their opinions merit scrutiny. 
96. Telephone interview with Glenn Smith, Minority Counsel, Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, Nov. 12, 1981.The Senate has subsequently approved the measure, 127 Cong. 
Rec. S. 2605-07 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982). 
97. Appropriations measures do not speak to the issue of underlying substantive administra-
tive authority and are controlling only with regard to the funds appropriated therein. A prohibi-
tion on funding included in an appropriation statute would bar an agency from spending on 
reimbursement, even if its organic statute expressly authorized it to do so. If the prohibition were 
not renewed, that agency could resume funding the following year out of general agency monies. 
98. Beside the cases discussed in this section of the text, several other cases have touched on 
the participant reimbursement issue. In one case, plaintiff challenged the exercise of funding 
authority by the Department of Energy. The court did not, however, reach the merits of the 
compensation issue. See Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). There also are several earlier decisions that allude to participant compensation but do not 
meaningfully treat the question of agency reimbursement power. See Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 645 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978); Citizens for a Safe Environment v. AEC, 489 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (3d Cir. 1974); Calvert 
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); 
see also York Comm. for a Safe Environment v. NRC, 527 F.2d 812, 816 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring); American Pub. Power Ass'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 142, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 849 (1972). 
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A. Greene County 
The Second Circuit en bane decision in Greene County Planning Board v. 
FPC, 99 issued in 1977, culminated nearly a decade of controversial administra-
tive and courtroom litigation over the construction of power lines in rural New 
York state. Several intervenors had persuaded the FPC to select a route less 
damaging to the environment than that initially recommended by the Com-
mission staff. The intervenors twice asked the agency to pay their participa-
tion costs, but their petitions were denied. On appeal of the first denial, a 
three-judge panel of the Second Circuit declined to order reimbursement 
because Congress had not specifically authorized it. 100 While the intervenors' 
appeal of the second adverse agency determination was pending, however, the 
Comptroller General issued the opinion finding that the FPC possessed com-
pensation power. A different panel then modified the earlier ruling. It de-
f erred to the Comptroller's position,101 agreeing that authorization for fund-
ing of indigent intervenors who contribute significantly to Commission 
hearings could reasonably be found in the agency's statutory mandate. The 
panel considered the Comptroller's opinion authoritative and stated that it 
could not be overturned unless clearly contrary to law. However, the court did 
not order the Commission to reimburse the participants, but rather remanded 
the matter to the agency to determine whether compensation was appropriate 
in the particular instance. 
The three-judge panel was reversed in a 5-3 decision of the Second Circuit 
sitting en bane. Although the court declared that there was no statutory basis 
for participant funding by the FPC, the precise holding in Greene County is 
ambiguous. It can be interpreted as broadly denying agency authority to 
reimburse public participants except pursuant to specific statutory powers. 
This view is supported by the court's reliance on the general spending restraint 
of 31 U.S.C. § 628, which provides that "sums appropriated for the various 
branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the 
objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others." Moreover, 
the majority never explicitly examined whether the FPC might have possessed 
implicit compensation authority, possibly indicating a fundamental rejection 
of the implied power concept. 
The Greene County decision may, however, also have been based on the 
particular posture of the litigation. The en bane court perceived a violation of 
the American rule against shifting of fees and expenses between parties to 
disputes. Because the FPC derived most of the funds for administering its 
utility licensing program from annual charges assessed licensees, the court 
may have believed that an FPC award to public intervenors who participated 
in a utility licensing proceeding would amount to proscribed fee-shifting. 
99. 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). For fine discussions of 
this case, see Note, 66 Geo. L.J. 931 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown Note]; Note, 
Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings, 27 Am. U.L. Rev. 981 (1978). 
100. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1972). 
101. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
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The Second Circuit observed as well that the FPC had never deemed itself 
empowered to pay intervenors' expenses. The court regarded this as very 
important, because the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with 
its administration is ordinarily entitled to considerable deference. The majori-
ty's position on the judicial deference to be accorded opinions of the Comp-
troller General, however, was quite different. The Second Circuit flatly 
refused to defer to the Comptroller on the question of agency reimbursement 
authority. Indeed, it seemed to view the dispute as presenting a clash between 
judicial power and that of the Comptroller General, declaring that the courts 
and not the Comptroller must "determine the intent of Congress as expressed 
in its legislative enactments." 102 
B. Chamber of Commerce and Goyan 
Two cases decided subsequent to Greene County raise similar issues, but 
in factually converse contexts. In the Second Circuit litigation, the administra-
tive agency argued that it lacked the power to compensate; in the later cases 
parties opposed to funding challenged agency findings of authority. Neverthe-
less, the concept of implied reimbursement power received a mixed judicial 
reception. 
1. Chamber of Commerce. Chamber of Commerce v. United States 
Department of Agriculture103 involved a challenge to the USDA's exercise of 
an assumed, implied power to pay for extra-agency factfinding. The Agricul-
ture Department had exercised this authority in a proceeding to establish 
standards for shrinkage of meat and poultry products during distribution. 
Because the USDA believed that it had insufficient data on the consumer 
impact of the existing and proposed regulations, 104 the Department, after 
soliciting bids, contracted with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) 
for an analysis of the economic effects of the proposed rules. Plaintiffs, who 
had consistently opposed the proposed net-weight regulations, sued to enjoin 
the USDA from paying for or using the CF A study. They contended that the 
Department lacked the authority to procure such a study. 
The court rejected plaintiffs' claims and upheld the exercise of power to 
fund. It found support for the USDA's position on implied reimbursement 
authority in the broad powers delegated to the Department under the Whole-
some Meat Act105 and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act 106 as well as the 
USDA appropriations statutes, which permit the agency to expend "such 
sums as are necessary" 107 to effectuate the mandates of the substantive acts. 
The court did not expressly defer to the Comptroller's opinions but relied on 
their reasoning and cited them authoritatively. Greene County was distin-
guishable, because the USDA found that it possessed implied power, a deter-
102. Id. at 1239. 
103. 459 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 1978). 
104. Id. at 218-19. 
105. 21 u.s.c. §§ 601-95 (1976). 
106. Id. §§ 451-70. 
107. Id. §§ 469, 680. 
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mination entitled to deference, and because compensation from the Depart-
ment's congressional appropriation was not deemed to be fee shifting 
proscribed by the American rule. 
Though the court addressed the issues underlying the question of implied 
funding authority, it is not clear that the facts involved an exercise of implied 
compensation power. Contracting with a group to conduct a consumer study 
to supplement the data base in an informal notice-comment rulemaking pro-
ceeding is not identical to reimbursing someone to advocate a particular 
perspective in a formal adjudicatory proceeding. Whether an agency could 
compensate in the latter situation was a question subsequently raised in Pa-
cific Legal Foundation v. Goyan. 108 In the final analysis, however, the 
general principle involved in both cases is similar: whether agencies possess 
similar authority to pay members of the public who can reasonably be ex-
pected to contribute to a full and fair determination of the issues involved in 
administrative proceedings but who might otherwise be unable to participate 
because of a lack of resources. 
2. Goyan. Goyan involved a challenge to FDA participant funding. The 
plaintiffs sought to invalidate a pilot program for reimbursing private parties 
participating in certain agency proceedings. The FDA had instituted the com-
pensation effort pursuant to its implied powers, relying principally upon the 
theory propounded in the Comptroller General's opinions.109 
The district court in Goyan approved the FDA funding program, taking a 
broad view of the administration's statutory mandate. It treated peremptorily 
the argument that agencies could fund only by specific legislative prescription, 
and explicitly found 31 U.S.C. § 628 inapplicable. The court distinguished 
Greene County, rejecting analogies to fee shifting and the American rule and 
emphasizing the Second Circuit's own deference to agency interpretation. The 
court relied in part upon the Comptroller General's opinions for its ruling that 
the agency had implied power. It also found a measure of specific 
congressional authorization for the FDA experiment in the legislative histories 
of the 1979 and 1980 appropriations bills, in which Congress indicated its 
awareness and tacit approval of the FDA's contemplated reimbursement pro-
gram.110 
In a cursory opinion, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed. m 
Marshaling support from Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
ety112 and Greene County, despite the differences between those cases and 
Goyan, the court trumpeted "the continuing vitality of the rule that, absent 
congressional authority to the contrary, participants pay their own way in 
legal proceedings." 113 The majority also stated that the legislature's failure, 
108. 500 F. Supp. 770 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981). 
109. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 23,044, 23,045, 23,047 (1979) with sources cited supra notes 54 & 
55. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 78 & 81. 
111. 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981). 
112. 421 U.S. 240 (1975), discussed infra notes 129 & 130 and accompanying text. 
113. 1\64 F.2d at 1225. 
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on several occasions, specifically to authorize compensation by all agencies, 114 
and its specific provision for participant funding by some agencies 115 meant 
that reimbursement power could not be implied from general agency author-
ity. Finally, the court found unreliable the inferences drawn from the appro-
priations materials by the district court, adopted the Second Circuit's position 
rejecting deference to the Comptroller, and concluded that it was the role of 
Congress, and not the agencies, to assume the initiative on participant com-
pensation.116 
Judge Murnaghan, the dissenting member of the Fourth Circuit panel, 
filed a better reasoned opinion. Recognizing the pervasive and necessary 
function of implicit powers in hierarchical government, he speculated that the 
majority's rejection of the FDA program reflected antipathy to the use of 
government money to promote partisan viewpoints. The dissent observed, 
however, that "[o]pposing expressions of competing and biased views, even if 
they are exaggerated or contradictory presentations of the facts, will often 
lead to a middle ground of truth and accuracy built on the existence of 
mutually modifying contrary contentions." 117 Judge Murnaghan reasoned 
that redress of the input imbalance attributable to resource inequality among 
the proponents of various views was perfectly compatible with existing FDA 
authority and function and a matter particularly appropriate for judicial 
deference. 
The legal issues raised by the establishment of compensation programs 
pursuant to implied authority are identified, but not comprehensively or 
clearly developed in the cases. The majorities in Greene County and Goyan 
have truncated analysis by drawing overly broad analogies from the American 
rule against fee shifting and by relying too greatly upon ambiguous congres-
sional expressions. These cases, however, will probably not be the final judi-
cial word on participant funding. Because the legislative status of regulatory 
reimbursement remains uncertain, primary responsibility for defining the per-
missibility, and even the scope, of agency-initiated compensation programs 
may well remain with the courts. Future judicial decisions will not only be 
important for the specific controversies they decide, but also may affect the 
substance and timing of eventual congressional resolution of the specific 
funding authorization issue. The same legal policies that argue for implied 
reimbursement power may recommend specific congressional action, as con-
tinued administration of agency-initiated programs generates operative experi-
ence on the basis of which specifically authorized efforts may later be fash-
ioned. There remains, therefore, a need for clear, reasoned, and systematic 
114. The opinion cited, inter alia, S. 1081, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and S. 405, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 664 F.2d at 1225-26 n.12; see also supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
115. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
116. The state court analogue of the majority opinions in Greene County and Goyan is 
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979). See generally Note, Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public 
Utilities Comm'n: The PUC's Power to Award Attorney Fees, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 969, 997-1000 
(1981). 
117. 664 F.2d at 1228. 
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articulation of legal issues relating to the exercise of implied compensation 
power. The following section identifies and develops these issues. 
III. A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF AGENCY 
REIMBURSEMENT AUTHORITY 
A. The Concept of Implied Authority 
There is no gainsaying the constitutional truism recited in Greene County 
that "[t]he authority of a Commission to disburse funds must come from 
Congress." 118 Compensation by an agency pursuant to a grant of specific 
statutory power from Congress is, of course, a valid exercise of delegated 
authority. But Congress obviously cannot delegate explicitly for every contin-
gency that departments and agencies might encounter. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, it is well established that federal agencies possess implied as well as 
express statutory authority. 
The Supreme Court held long ago that the Secretary of the Treasury had 
implied power to require oaths when paying claims, declaring it to be "a 
general principle of law, in the construction of ... powers ... that where the 
end is required, the appropriate means are given." 119 Modern-day courts 
continue to adhere to the doctrine of implied statutory authority, 120 the Sec-
ond Circuit itself observing that "[i]t has been the law at least since McCul-
loch v. Maryland ... that the lawful delegation of a power carries with it the 
authority to do whatever is reasonable and appropriate properly to effectuate 
the power." 121 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the general 
doctrine of implied authority extends to the disposition of the rights and 
property of the federal government, 122 presumably including the disbursement 
of public money for participant funding. 
A body of case law respecting the implied powers of particular adminis-
trative agencies also has developed. The FPC, found not to possess implied 
reimbursement authority in Greene County, is a useful paradigm. Numerous 
federal appeals court panels have recognized that the broad scope of the 
118. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1239 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
119. United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 255 (1835). See generally McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
120. E.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United States v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945); Lehigh & N.E. Ry. v. ICC, 540 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974); Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36 
(10th Cir. 1963). 
121. Gallagher's Steak House Inc. v. Bowles, 142 F.2d 530, 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 
U.S. 764 (1944). 
122. 
Power to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States is 
lodged in the Congress by the Constitution. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2. Subordinate officers of 
the United States are without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them 
by Act of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted. 
Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (emphasis added). 
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Commission's powers includes by implication the unstated but requisite au-
thority for effective discharge of its duties. 123 The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, held that the FPC had implied power to establish uniform account-
ing regulations for its licensees, although no such authority was specifically 
granted in the agency's enabling statutes.124 
The test of whether the doctrine of implied powers permits a particular 
agency to spend in a manner not specifically prescribed by statute will depend 
on the statutory scope of the agency's authority in general, the existence of an 
explicit residuary powers or spending clause in its enabling or appropriations 
legislation, and the nature of the expenditure. An administrative body to 
which Congress has given a general public interest mandate, a wide range of 
regulatory responsibilities, and a panoply of administrative devices for effect-
ing the mandate may logically possess implied, adjunct powers to expedi-
tiously implement those specifically provided. Grants of broad statutory au-
thority to undertake such actions or to "make such expenditures as are 
necessary to execute [agency] functions" 125 also indicate that the scope of 
these agency powers includes participant compensation. So long as an expense 
is reasonably necessary and fairly appropriate to efficacious agency decision-
making, it is no different from any other exercise of an implicit administrative 
prerogative. Funding members of the public whose participation in proceed-
ings improves the decisional process and contributes to an appearance of fair 
treatment and consequent public acceptance of agency action comes within 
the ambit of the power delegated. 
The venerable admonition126 of 31 U.S.C. § 628 that "sums appropriated 
... shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, 
and for no others" does not preclude exercise of implied spending authority to 
reimburse participants or otherwise. As the Comptroller General has consist-
ently maintained, 127 where Congress has allocated funds for a particular 
123. In Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court 
declared: 
The [Federal Power] Act is not to be given a tight reading wherein every action of the 
Commission is justified only if referable to express statutory authorization. On the 
contrary, the Act is one that entrusts a broad subject-matter to administration by the 
Commission, subject to Congressional oversight, in the light of new and evolving 
problems and doctrines. 
Id. at 158; see Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1971); Public Serv. 
Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 
142 F.2d 943, 952 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. FPC, 
131 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); see also Permian Basin Area Rate 
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968). 
124. Northern States Power Co. v. FPC, 118 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1941). 
125. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). 
126. The current Code section has its source in Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 535, 
which provided for the financial regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments. 
127. 
While 31 U.S.C. § 628 (1970) prohibits agencies from using appropriated funds except 
for the purposes for which the appropriation was made, we have long held where an 
appropriation is made for a particular object, purpose, or program, it is available for 
expenses which are reasonably necessary and proper or incidental to the execution of the 
object, purpose or program for which the appropriation was made, except as to expendi-
tures in contravention of law or for some purpose for which other appropriations are 
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purpose, an expenditure that is reasonably necessary to effectuate that pur-
pose may logically be considered application of funds for an object of con-
gressional appropriation. Indeed, the residuary spending clauses, allowing 
agencies to spend for "all necessary expenses," can be viewed as satisfying the 
requirement that administrative expenditures be appropriately limited. A 
more literal and restrictive interpretation of section 628 would sacrifice the 
administrative flexibility needed for faithful and effective implementation of 
congressional intent. It could, moreover, threaten the legality of a wide range 
of agency actions previously authorized by the Comptroller pursuant to the 
notion of implied spending authority.12s 
B. Fee Disbursement and Fee Shifting 
Although the implied power concept is sufficiently broad to include the 
disbursement authority delegated to the agencies, it is not the only factor that 
must be considered in evaluating the compensation power of specific agencies. 
Administrative rulemaking proceedings in which citizen participants oppose 
positions of industry and adjudicatory proceedings in which public interve-
nors challenge industry petitions seeking authorization for certain activities 
assume an adversarial cast. Reimbursing entities involved in these proceedings 
may appear to violate the American rule, which proscribes shifting of fees and 
expenses from losing to prevailing parties in legal contests. The Supreme 
Court recently upheld the doctrine in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society, 129 declaring that "absent statute or enforceable contract, liti-
gants pay their own attorneys' fees." 130 
made specifically available. 6 Comp. Gen. 621 (1927); 17 id. 636 (1938); 29 id. 421 
(1950); 44 id. 312 (1964); 50 id. 534 (1971); 53 id. 351 (1973). 
Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC, supra note 54, at 420. 
128. See United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313 (D.N.J. 1976). 
129. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Supreme Court in Alyeska reversed the District of Columbia 
Circuit's award of attorneys' fees to be paid by the builders of the Alaskan oil pipeline to several 
environmental public interest groups that had opposed its construction. The court of appeals had 
relied upon its equitable powers and the theory that the opponents of the project were entitled to 
expenses because they had acted as "private attorneys general" in vindicating important public 
interests. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a comprehensive 
discussion of the factual background of this litigation, see Dominick & Brody, The Alaska 
Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 Am. 
U.L. Rev. 337 (1973). Other recent cases upholding the longstanding American rule include F.D. 
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 
U.S. l (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). The 
administrative analogue of Alyeska is Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. Office 
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (FCC 
possessed authority to approve voluntary agreements calling for fee shifting between parties to 
administrative proceedings). 
The finding in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 
891, 909-10, 603 P.2d 41, 51-52, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 134-35 (1979), that the Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) lacked authority to shift fees between parties to a ratemaking proceeding, is 
similar to the holding in Turner. The same court also found, however, that the PUC was 
empowered to shift fees between parties to a reparation proceeding because of its quasi-judicial 
character. Id. at 907-09, 603 P.2d at 50-51, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. See generally Note, supra 
note 116. The Colorado Supreme Court has found that the PUC was authorized to shift fees 
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I. Prototypal Fee Disbursement. Fee shifting between parties and fee 
disbursement from agency appropriations are similar in that each relieves an 
entity involved in a legal proceeding of the expense incurred when attempting 
to vindicate a legal position. By indiscriminately applying the proposition 
articulated in Alyeska that parties to legal disputes pay their own way, the 
American rule could be expanded to encompass not only fee shifting, but also 
fee disbursement. There are persuasive reasons, however, why extension of 
the American rule against fee shifting to include generic participant compen-
sation would be inappropriate. 
Three policy grounds have been articulated in support of the American 
rule: 131 that persons, especially those who are impecunious, should not be 
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit; that the time, cost, 
and difficulties of proof inherent in resolving the question of what constitute 
reasonable litigation expenses would substantially burden judicial administra-
tion; and that independent advocacy might be threatened if attorneys' earn-
ings were determined by the judge before whom they argue. The first rationale 
and its corollary-"that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from institut-
ing actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees 
of their opponents' counsel" 132-are inapplicable to participant funding. Be-
cause costs of reimbursing participants are not borne by the losing party, but 
are paid from money appropriated to the agency, no penalty is imposed upon 
unsuccessful litigants and no deterrent effect results. 
The possibility of using decentralized decisionmakers to process compen-
sation applications and requests for reimbursement tempers the force of the 
latter two arguments. Determining the amount of reimbursement to be paid 
need not unduly burden agency administration because the agencies generally 
do not treat the issue of reasonableness of fees and expenses as one for 
resolution through litigation. Most agencies set fee schedules in advance and 
relegate to fiscal officials the responsibility for settling disagreements about 
the amount of compensation to be paid.133 To the extent that agencies subject 
disputes over expenses to resolution in an adjudicatory context, the proce-
dures generally do not involve the agency officer who conducted the proceed-
ing in which costs were incurred.134 Providing separate personnel and proce-
between parties to a ratemaking proceeding. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. 
Comm'n, 576 P .2d 544 (Colo. 1978). 
Much has been written about the American rule. See, e.g., Special Project, Recent Develop-
ments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 719-33 (1976); Note, Defrosting the Alyeska 
Chill: The Future of Attorneys' Fees Awards in Environmental Litigation, 5 Envtl. Aff. 297 
(1976); Comment, Alternatives for the Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Litigation 
after Alyeska v. Wilderness Soc'y, 16 Nat. Resources J. 1003 (1976); Comment, Attorneys' Fees 
in Public Interest Litigation: A Return to the Wilderness of the American Rule, 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 
240 (1975). 
130. 421 U.S. at 257. 
131. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
132. Id. at 718. 
133. See; e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 904 (1981) (NOAA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.250, 10.275 (1980) (FDA). 
134. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.275 (1981). 
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dures for the specific purpose of handling reimbursement requests minimizes 
the difficulties that attend judicial awards of fees and expenses. 
Decentralized decisionmaking on funding applications and reimburse-
ment requests also means that agency compensation need not endanger inde-
pendent advocacy in administrative proceedings. Most agencies do not place 
ultimate responsibility for ascertaining whether and in what amount funding 
should be awarded with the officer who conducts the proceeding for which 
compensation is sought.135 Reimbursed participants, thus, would have little 
incentive to tailor their presentations to satisfy the agency officials before 
whom they appear. It is conceivable, of course, that administrative staff 
members who process applications might be more favorably disposed toward 
the funding requests of those applicants who indicate a willingness to advocate 
the position espoused by the agency.136 Agencies have guarded against this, 
however, by insulating employees with final decisionmaking authority on 
citizen compensation from the substantive administrative proceedings.137 
Fee disbursement, moreover, is not burdened by the restrictive historical 
legacy that attends fee shifting.138 Alyeska was rendered in the context of a 
long line of decisions upholding the American rule, comprehensive legislation 
governing costs and docketing fees that does not provide for fee shifting, and 
statutes authorizing recovery of fees and expenses in particular kinds of 
cases.139 None of these considerations applies to fee disbursement. There is 
no longstanding proscription of administrative reimbursement of public par-
ticipants, and Congress has enacted substantive measures governing compen-
sation on only a few occasions. 
Finally, the essential character of reimbursement is very different from 
fee shifting. As Judge Lumbard, dissenting in Greene County, observed, fee 
disbursement "involves no direct exercise of compulsion against a private 
party." 140 The benefit to the fee recipient does not come at the expense of 
legal adversaries. The analogy to fee shifting also fails because of the funda-
mentally disparate functions of administrative and judicial decisionmakers. 
As Judge Murnaghan observed in Goyan, the agency does not act merely as a 
disinterested referee supervising a private controversy, but actively pursues the 
advancement of the public good.141 The reimbursement principle legitimately 
135. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.6, 12.7 (1981) (USDA); 14 C.F.R. §§ 304.7, 304.8 (1981) 
(CAB). However, some agencies do give the presiding officer in the proceeding a recommendatory 
function. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.215 (1981) (FDA); 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d) (1) (1981) (FTC). 
136. This is one charge of abuse in the administration of reimbursement programs leveled by 
opponents of compensation. See, e.g., S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18, at 10-16. 
137. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.2(f) (1981) (USDA); 14 C.F.R. § 304.7(a) (1981) (CAB). 
Moreover, the objective nature of the criteria that must be satisfied before reimbursement can be 
awarded should afford some additional protection. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.220(c)(3) (1981) 
(FDA). 
138. See Georgetown Note, supra note 99, at 943-44. 
139. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(Lumbard, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
140. Id. at 1242 (citation omitted); accord Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of 
Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.D.C. 1978). 
141. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1228 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, J., 
dissenting). See generally Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
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"calls for the United States itself to pay for the valuable services performed in 
furtherance of the public interest" 142 and promotes positive values of citizen 
involvement and informed decisionmaking. 
The uncritical and undifferentiated analogies drawn by the Second and 
Fourth Circuits to classical fee shifting, and the support they invoke from 
Alyeska and its antecedents, are unwarranted. Policy and historical rationales 
argue against extending the American rule on shifting of fees and expenses 
between litigants to include disbursements from agency appropriations for 
costs of public participation in administrative proceedings. Whether the 
American rule applies to citizen compensation paid primarily from charges 
assessed against agency licensees is, however, a closer question. 
2. Disbursement by Agencies Supported by Regulated Entities. Partici-
pant funding by agencies whose administrative expenses are paid mainly with 
the fees of regulated parties closely resembles the fee shifting discountenanced 
by the American rule. The money awarded participants would come from 
their adversaries in the administrative proceedings, the commercial entities 
whose positions they have challenged. For example, regulated utilities paid 
nearly all of the costs incurred by the FPC in operating its licensing program, 
and the Commission in Greene County successfully contended that compensa-
tion of public intervenors would in effect be impermissible fee shifting.143 
Yet, while disbursement paid out of licensee charges has the appearance 
of fee shifting, and although Greene County can be understood as limited to 
the effect produced by this type of disbursement, the analogy to the American 
rule must be rejected here as well. Even if this disbursement is assumed to be 
operatively similar to classical fee shifting, the administrative context and the 
agency-licensee relationship remove reimbursement from the strictures of the 
otherwise applicable rule. The powers of the agency to issue licenses and exact 
licensing fees to cover administrative costs are one with its regulatory respon-
sibilities, hearing and rulemaking authority, and legislative mandate to under-
take all actions and pay all expenses necessary to implement its statutory 
duties. Funding that facilitates efficacious decisionmaking is a legitimate 
exercise of agency authority that does not violate the American rule, despite 
an appearance of fee shifting. 
More fundamentally, though, scrutiny of the purposes, policies, and 
effects of reimbursement leads to the conclusion that reimbursement is not fee 
shifting even where payment derives from administrative charges imposed on 
the regulated interests. Fees of public participants are not imposed exclusively 
on the losing party in the same proceeding in the manner that characterizes 
classical judicial fee shifting. The administrative forum is not the typical 
adversarial legal arena, and the administrative decision is not a determination 
142. 664 F.2d at 1230 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(e) (1974); Brief for Respondent on Rehearing En Banc at 9-13, 
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 
(1978). The Commission noted that "[i]n 1974 the total cost of administering Part 1 of the 
[Federal Power] Act was approximately 4.3 million, of which 4.2 million was recovered through 
annual charges." Id. at 12 n.7. 
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of winners and losers, because the decisionmaking process is directed at 
furthering the broad public interest. The policies that underlie the American 
rule-not penalizing the exercise of legal rights, avoiding complex determina-
tions of legal expenses, and preserving independent advocacy 144-are met 
equally well in this context as they are in prototypal fee disbursement. Perhaps 
most importantly, the perception that the source of money for compensation 
derives from adversaries may itself be erroneous. Commercial entities pay 
annual charges to the agency for the cost of administering the regulatory 
scheme because Congress has so provided. Independently, the agency deter-
mines that it needs the input of public participants to make the best substan-
tive decision and pays participant costs as a necessary regulatory expense. 
There is no shifting of resources from loser to winner, but rather authorized 
agency expenditure for one of the costs of administering the regulatory sys-
tem. 
C. Judicial Deference 
Although, as a general principle, agencies and departments may possess 
the power to spend appropriated money to implement objectives within their 
statutory mandates, the extent to which a particular agency or department 
may go in exercising such authority in specific instances will depend on the 
wording of its enabling and appropriation statutes, the scope of the legislative 
delegation, and any extra-statutory congressional expression. The different 
considerations will be assigned weight of varying degrees of strength by the 
Comptroller General, the agencies themselves, and individual members of 
Congress, all of which should be considered by the courts addressing ques-
tions of implied reimbursement power. While the positions articulated by 
legislative and administrative authorities will necessarily enter the judicial 
calculus, determining the amount of deference that courts should accord to 
these nonjudicial expressions raises controversial and complex issues. Analysis 
of the interpretive roles of the legislative and administrative bodies, as well as 
traditional concepts of judicial function and statutory construction, lead to 
the conclusion that, except for specific statutory prescriptions or proscrip-
tions, courts should not consider dispositive any of the nonjudicial expres-
sions. 
1. Opinions of the Comptroller General. Courts ruling on the question of 
agency compensation power have accorded different weight to the participant 
reimbursement opinions rendered by the Comptroller General. These determi-
nations have been issued under statutory authority, providing that govern-
ment officials "may apply for and the Comptroller General shall render his 
decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by them or under 
them, which decision, when rendered, shall govern the General Accounting 
Office [GAO] in passing upon the account containing said disbursement." 145 
Even prior to 1894, when this provision was passed as part of the Dockery Act 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37. 
145. 31 u.s.c. § 74 (1976). 
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reorganization of the federal auditing and accounting system, 146 government 
comptrollers and auditors had performed the judge-like duty of statutory 
construction.147 The Attorney General subsequently confirmed that the 
powers formerly exercised by the accounting officials were assumed by the 
Comptroller General.148 The courts have also stated that Comptroller opin-
ions may necessarily be based on the interpretation and application of stat-
utes.149 But while the Comptroller's determinations estop the General Ac-
counting Office from subsequently challenging agency actions in conformance 
therewith, and while some judges and the Attorney General have found that 
these rulings bind the executive branch, 150 there is nearly universal agreement 
that the Comptroller's opinions can be contested in the courts. 151 Thus, 
claimants who are denied government payment pursuant to legal determina-
tions of the Comptroller General may judicially challenge those rulings, 152 and 
the courts will generally review the issues de novo.153 
Nondeferential review of the Comptroller's decisions comports with the 
character and authority of the Comptroller's office. While Congress may have 
designated the fiscal official its principal agent for determining whether fed-
eral expenditures comply with the language and purpose of its enactments, the 
Comptroller's role in supervising executive and administrative spending 
should not dictate how courts review the Comptroller's rulings. The Comp-
troller is not vested with administration of the particular statutes under which 
146. Act of July 31, 1894, ch. 174, §§ 3-9, 28 Stat. 205-08, as amended, Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20. 
147. See 26 Cong. Rec. 7483-84 (1894); see also Note, The Control Powers of the Comptrol· 
!er General, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 (1956). 
148. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 182 (1895); accord 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 267 (1922); 21 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 178 (1895). But cf. Morgan, supra note 52, at 1303 n.78 (repeated discussion of 
"judicial role" of Comptroller General in debates on the Act were all in context of salary and 
tenure that official should have; beyond that the references were mere hyperbole). 
149. See Brunswick v. Elliott, 103 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
150. See United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100 
(D.D.C.}, aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 267 (1922); see 
also Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1031 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (GAO "decisions respecting money 
claims are binding on the Executive branch of the Government" citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 44, 71, 74 
(1970), even though GAO decision was not rendered pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970)); United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 545 F.2d 624, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1976) (GAO certification of accounts 
under 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1976) may estop agencies in subsequent litigation). But see Cibinic & 
Lasken, supra note 52, at 360, arguing that the Dockery Act does not make the Comptroller's 
opinions binding even on the executive branch, but that they are merely advisory. 
151. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1239 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); id. at 1241 n.1 (Lumbard, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. 
Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753 
(D.C. Cir. 1964); see also United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463 n.6 
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Morgan, supra note 52, at 1300-03. 
152. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 545 F.2d 624, 638 (9th Cir. 1976); Wheelabrator 
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Keco Indus. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 
1361 (D.D.C. 1970); United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100 
(D.D.C.}, aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
153. See Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 
F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1951); James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. 
Cal. 1950); United States v. Heller, 1 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1932). See generally Morgan, supra note 
52, at 1300-03. 
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agencies seek to assert their spending power.154 Comptroller rulings on dis-
bursement therefore differ from statutory interpretation by agencies in the 
fields of their substantive expertise, to which courts have traditionally ac-
ceded. Judges have been especially reluctant to defer to decisions that conflict 
with constructions espoused by the agencies themselves.155 Although courts 
have acceded to determinations of the Comptroller rejecting challenges of 
disappointed bidders on government contracts, 156 that deference is probably 
dictated by concerns peculiar to the procurement context. The public interest 
in a smoothly functioning process of government contracting 157 would be ill-
served by probing judicial review of the multitude of awards in federal bidding 
contests. Moreover, in resolving disputes over bid protests, the Comptroller's 
role is analogous to agencies interpreting their delegated authority so that the 
Comptroller exercises the focused expertise that warrants judicial deference.158 
The Comptroller General's position on agency power to reimburse public 
participants, like his rulings generally, cannot command much judicial defer-
ence. Nevertheless, to accord Comptroller opinions no more weight than 
unofficial commentary would be to ignore the import of the supervisory and 
advisory authority that Congress has actually vested in that official, as well as 
the office's accumulated expertise. An intermediate course is, therefore, ap-
propriate. As the Goyan district court observed, the Comptroller's "decisions 
are entitled to more than just cursory consideration, particularly within a 
context where it appears that his views have been brought to the attention of 
Congress." 159 The quality of the specific analysis, the length of time and 
consistency with which the Comptroller has maintained the position, and the 
degree to which the ruling comports with the view of the agency itself are 
variables that may also govern the strength accorded the Comptroller's opin-
ions. While Comptroller decisions do not relieve courts of their responsibility 
for de novo review, the rulings are a factor for judicial consideration in the 
reimbursement context, as in other judicial determinations on government 
expenditure. 
2. Agency Interpretation. An agency's interpretation of its own power to 
compensate seems to deserve no greater deference than the rulings of the 
Comptroller General, even though the courts, with the exception of the Goyan 
154. See Georgetown Note, supra note 99, at 941-42 and cases cited therein. 
155. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256, 264 (1933). 
156. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wheelabrator 
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970). For an analysis 
of these and other decisions in this line of authority, see Morgan, supra note 52, at 1339-44; Note, 
Judicial Review and Remedies for the Unsuccessful Bidder on Federal Government Contracts, 47 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 496, 504-17 (1972). 
157. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1300, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See 
generally Note, supra note 156, at 504-17. 
158. Morgan observes that "[j]udicial rhetoric [in the bid-challenge cases may have] created 
authority in the GAO that Congress had never chosen to provide." Morgan, supra note 52, at 
1344. 
159. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 500 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 
1221 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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appeals panel, have appeared to defer to administrative constructions regard-
ing reimbursement authority. The judiciary generally accords weight of vary-
ing degrees of strength to interpretation of legislation by the agency charged 
with its administration.160 The Supreme Court has said that an agency's 
construction of legislation that it executes "should be followed unless there 
are compelling indications that it is wrong." 161 However, the Court has also 
declared that "administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given 
important but not controlling significance" 162 and even that "a departmental 
construction of its own enabling legislation ... is only one input in the 
decisional equation." 163 Identifying the factors on which judicial deference 
depends is speculative and often complex, and any of the accepted criteria can 
be offset by others, articulated and unarticulated, in a particular case. As 
Professor Davis has observed, "the degree of intensiveness of [judicial] review 
is and probably should be for judicial discretion, and the exercise of discretion 
must probably depend to some extent upon psychological considerations, as 
well as upon formulas and theories." 164 
Despite the uncertainty, courts and commentators have isolated certain 
considerations that have purportedly guided judges in reviewing administra-
tive interpretations. Principal variables are the comparative qualifications of 
the agency and of the court to decide the particular question, the nature, 
scope, and specific exercise of the power committed to the agency by the 
legislative branch, and whether the issues involve enunciation of general 
principles or application of legal concepts to particular facts. 165 Against these 
criteria, the weight due an agency's construction of its own authority to 
compensate participants in agency proceedings must be gauged. 
The first factor requires deference where administrative interpretation 
involves application of expertise that is the peculiar province of the agency. 
Thus, judges generally will accord considerable weight to an agency construc-
tion relating to either scientific or technical expertise or that type of experience 
160. See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise§§ 5.03-.06, 30.01-.14 (1958); id.§ 
7:8-:15 (2d ed. 1979); id. § 7:13 -:14 (2d ed. Supp. 1982); Schopler, Supreme Court's View as to 
Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial Construction, to Prior Administrative 
Construction of a Statute, 39 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1975). 
161. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); accord FCC v. WNCN 
Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 532, 598 (1981); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 n.25 (1979); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55-57 (1977); New York State Dep't of Social 
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). 
162. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977); see also United States v. National Ass'n 
of Security Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975). 
163. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969). The Court exhibited even less deference when 
it said that "[i]n order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent 
with the congressional purpose." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (citing Espinoza v. 
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969)). As one court has observed, "[T]his very nearly eliminates the 'deference' principle as 
regards statutory construction altogether since if the agency's interpretation is found by a court to 
be consistent with the congressional purpose, it presumably would be affirmed on that ground 
without any need for deference." Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977). 
164. K. bavis, supra note 160, § 30.08. 
165. Id. 
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that comes from resolving problems in the specialized area over which the 
agency has jurisdiction.166 However, "on ordinary problems of interpreting 
statutes, the courts are the specialists" 167 and the "final authorities." 168 The 
interpretation of administrative enabling and appropriations statutes to deter-
mine the existence of implied reimbursement authority clearly involves exper-
tise of the latter kind, and the courts have no reason, on this account, to defer 
to the agency position.169 
The second major consideration requires a determination as to the na-
ture, scope, and specific exercise of the power granted the agency. Where the 
disputed administrative interpretation involves an exercise of authority that 
appears to expand the contours of an agency's statutory power, the judiciary 
generally has not been deferential. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 
Inc., 170 for example, the Supreme Court stated that the "determination of the 
166. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1980) (administra-
tive agencies are simply better suited than courts to engage in an "empirical process that entails 
investigation into consumer psychology and that presupposes broad experience with credit prac-
tices"); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54 (1977) (deference to "an 
agency with great experience in the industry . . . given the task of applying . . . criteria to 
particular business situations"). 
167. K. Davis, supra note 160, § 30.09; see Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 
F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) ("there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of 
judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the meaning of a statutory 
term"), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); see also 
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977) (presumed expertise of agency of limited 
value when narrow legal issue is one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution); Barlow v. Collins, 
397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (little judicial deference to agency where dispute relates to meaning of statutory term, 
and controversy must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special 
competence of the agency, but by judicial application of canons of statutory construction); 
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (since statutory 
construction is the "sort of question [that] calls largely for the exercise of historical analysis and 
logical and analogical reasoning, it is the everyday staple of judges as well as agencies"), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239, 
264-72 (1955). 
168. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38, 
42 (1981); accord FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Wilderness Soc'y v. 
Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 864 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
169. It is possible to argue that courts should defer to agency determinations respecting 
reimbursement, because the decision to compensate involves questions that agencies are more 
competent to answer than courts. For example, agencies are better qualified to determine the 
quantity, quality, and costs of public participation in its proceedings, whether increased public 
participation might improve the quality of agency decisionmaking, and how best to allocate 
agency resources. However, this type of distinction-in essence one pertaining to "procedural" 
expertise-does not find expression in the case law. Moreover, resolution of the issue of agency 
reimbursement authority calls for a threshold determination that involves primarily if not exclu-
sively questions of statutory interpretation. 
170. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). The Addison decision voided a regulation promulgated by the 
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor pursuant to an erroneously perceived 
implicit delegation of authority. The Court noted that Congress had made a specific grant of 
power to the agency without substantive line-drawing authority, and that the language of the 
relevant statute precluded administrative construction that would enlarge the delegated power. 
There are, however, some statutory schemes in which Congress has delegated to agencies the 
authority to make substantive determinations within circumscribed subject matter areas. Under 
these circumstances, the judiciary has accorded substantial deference to an agency's interpreta-
tions of its authority. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 
102 S. Ct. 38 (1981); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). 
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extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the 
decision of him in whom authority is vested." 171 This is consistent with the 
accepted dichotomy between agency rules that are legislative and those that 
are interpretive.172 As the Court explained recently in Batterton v. Francis, 113 
legislative regulations are issued by agencies when Congress has entrusted 
them with "primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term." 174 
"Such rules have the force and effect of law .... By way of contrast, a court 
is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation." 175 In the latter 
instance, the courts may accord agency constructions varying degrees of 
deference, even substituting judicial judgment for that of the administrative 
body. Because the exercise of implied funding authority rests on a determina-
tion respecting the contours of an agency's delegated power, the agency 
cannot, in the first instance, determine the propriety of that exercise. More-
over, if Congress has not specifically provided an agency with substantive 
authority to effectuate a reimbursement program, the agency's rulemaking in 
the area must be regarded as fundamentally interpretive. Under either per-
spective, little deference is due the agency determination. 
171. 322 U.S. at 616; accord East Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 
351 U.S. 49, 54 (1956); Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Hi-Craft 
Clothing v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430, 
433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962); Florida Citrus Exch. v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850, 
857 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fleming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 
153 (1958); Robinson v. Vollert, 411 F. Supp. 461, 475 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Stark v. Brannan, 82 F. 
Supp. 615, 618 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); 
see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490 (1979). See generally CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 325, 334 (1961); 
United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947). 
In instances in which courts have deferred to administrative statutory construction, Congress 
appears to have placed its imprimatur on the agency's interpretation. See, e.g., Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 
U.S. 395, 410-11 (1975); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38, 45 (1981). 
172. K. Davis, supra note 160, § 30.10. 
173. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). In Batterton, the Court confirmed the unemployment eligibility 
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare pursuant to a specific 
delegation under the Social Security Act. By contrast, in Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 
358 (1946), the Court rejected the Social Security Board's construction of the Act that would have 
excluded backpay from the statutory definition of wages. The Court observed that Congress had 
not delegated to the Board the determination of what constituted wages. 
174. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425. The question is not whether substantive power is given but 
whether substantive power to draw lines is given. For example, if Congress authorizes an agency 
to make such reimbursements as will enable it to receive all information necessary for dccision-
making, the agency is provided primary reponsibility to decide when and how to compensate 
participants, and the power is legislative. But, if Congress authorizes an agency to take whatever 
actions, or make whatever expenditures, are necessary to implement the statute, the agency is not 
given primary responsibility to decide whether reimbursement is necessary to implement the 
statute, and the power is therefore interpretive. See also K. Davis, supra note 160, at §§ 7:8, 
29.00-7 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.). 
175. 432 U.S. at 425 n.9 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947)); accord, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 
301-03 (1979); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976). The classic statement of 
the effect to be given interpretive rules appears in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). 
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Third, resolution of the statutory issue of agency compensation power 
involves articulation of general concepts, rather than application of rules of 
law to particular facts or circumstances. The threshold determination of the 
existence of funding authority is a generic one, the consequences of which 
extend to a broad range of rulemaking and adjudicatory activities. This type 
of judgment is also primarily the province of the courts, 176 and they need not, 
therefore, accede to agency views. 
Other factors relevant to judicial deference to administrative interpreta-
tions add little to the analysis. The funding programs were neither established 
contemporaneously with enactment of the statutory clauses on which they are 
premised,177 nor have they attained the stature of longstanding, continuous, 
and consistent agency practices that the judiciary has been hesitant to dis-
turb.178 Moreover, it is difficult to find de facto ratification of the agency 
initiatives 179 in Congress's ambiguous treatment of reimbursement. While 
courts have acceded to administrative constructions when the agency has a 
history of accurate interpretation of its power and substantial experience in 
the administration of its statute, 180 these factors alone are probably insuffi-
cient to bind the judiciary in the novel area of participant compensation. 
Unless a court concludes that Congress intended that an agency have 
authority to decide whether participant funding was within its substantive 
grant of power, the agency's determination cannot command judicial defer-
ence. The agency interpretations may warrant even less consideration than 
those of the Comptroller General, to whom Congress has explicitly granted a 
measure of interpretive authority. While the administrative position on reim-
bursement should not be ignored, it is only one piece of informed input 
among many that courts may consult in analyzing agency power to compen-
sate.181 
176. K. Davis, supra note 160, at§ 30.11. 
177. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1981); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods 
Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 
U.S. 472, 477 (1979); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. 
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); Schopler, supra note 160, at 965-66. 
178. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Board of Governors v. First 
Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 
450 (1978); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); 
Schopler, supra note 160, at 966-69. 
179. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. 
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1961); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FrC, 482 F.2d 672, 
695-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
180. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct. 
38, 44-45 (1981); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1976), 
aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Thompson v. 
Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1968); K. Davis, supra note 160, at§ 30.08. 
181. Of course, enactment of the Bumpers Amendment in most of the forms proposed to 
date would require that courts accord even less deference to an agency's interpretation of its own 
implied reimbursement authority. See generally O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study 
of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739 (1980); Wood-
ward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 329 
(1979). 
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3. Congressional Expression. With little persuasive judicial precedent and 
few authoritative sources of statutory construction, courts understandably 
must ascertain whether anything can be gleaned from the legislative activity 
relating to participant funding. Congress has shown considerable interest in 
agency reimbursement and has spoken to the issue in substantive and appro-
priations enactments, in committee reports and floor debates, and in legisla-
tive proposals.182 The inferences to be drawn from these sources vary, be-
cause Congress has not given clear and comprehensive consideration to 
compensation. 
The interpretive task of the courts, bridging legislative prerogative and 
judicial decision, is difficult. It should not be complicated, however, by 
confusing the roles of court, legislature, and administrative agency. Chief 
Judge Kaufman, in the Greene County concurring opinion, urged that "[t]he 
decision whether to expend public funds to advance an essentially private 
point of view by its very nature is political, and in a democracy, more 
appropriately made by the elected representatives of the people" and added 
that selection among potential applicants for reimbursement presents "choices 
[that] are particularly unamenable to judicial structuring." 183 These admoni-
tions are misplaced. The court's function in the compensation controversy 
involves neither the usurpation of legislative prerogative nor the administra-
tive exercise of distributional choice.184 The judicial task is to make a thresh-
old determination about the existence of agency funding authority by per-
forming the traditional duty of statutory interpretation. 
In pursuing this statutory analysis, judges have indicated that Congress's 
failure to adopt measures granting all agencies reimbursement power demon-
strates that such authority does not exist absent specific legislative direc-
tive.185 However, the Supreme Court has long held that reliable conclusions 
as to the intent of Congress cannot be drawn from its failure to enact legisla-
tion.186 In the particular context of the compensation controversy, proposals 
providing for funding on a government-wide basis may have been introduced 
and considered to eliminate doubt, to afford explicit guidance for the institu-
tion of reimbursement programs, to minimize duplication through uniform-
182. See supra notes 67-97 and accompanying text. 
183. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1240 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
184. See id. at 1241, 1243 n.6 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("It would be the administrative 
agency, and not the court, which in the first instance would determine whether intervenors make a 
substantial enough contribution to the administrative process to merit a fee award."). 
185. See id. at 1239-40; Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (4th Cir. 
1981). 
186. See American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944); Helvering v. Hallock, 
309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940). The Court has said that it "may often be shaky business to 
attribute significance to the inaction of Congress." Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International 
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 409 (1961); see also United States v. 
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979). 
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ity, to encourage more agencies to initiate funding efforts 187 or for any 
number of other reasons.188 
The more troubling question is why Congress would have specifically 
empowered a few agencies to compensate if it believed that every agency 
already possessed funding authority .189 An answer is provided in National 
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 190 in which the FTC sought broadly to 
exercise substantive rulemaking power specifically granted in some, but not 
all, of the statutes administered by the Commission. The District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the FTC had broad rulemaking authority. It speculated that 
Congress may have enacted legislation providing the specific grants of rule-
making power out of "uncertainty, understandable caution, and a desire to 
avoid litigation." 191 Because all of the specific reimbursement authoriza-
tions, except that of the State Department, were included in newly passed 
agency-specific measures for regulating particular substantive areas, 192 it 
could be inferred that enactment of these prescriptions was simply a matter of 
legislative convenience. Congress also may have deemed compensated public 
participation so indispensable to accomplishment of particular agencies' man-
dates as to obviate the need for its specific provision.193 
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw defensible inferences from 
legislative failure to adopt general funding proposals and congressional provi-
sion for reimbursement by a few agencies. Congress's rejection of substantive 
measures, both authorizing and prohibiting participant compensation by all 
agencies, as well as its specific authorization of funding by some agencies and 
its contrary directives in the appropriations process to others, indicates that 
the legislature has not spoken definitively to the issue of a general administra-
tive power of participant reimbursement. 
Analysis of agency funding authority must therefore focus on particular 
administrative bodies. Even here, Congress has not unequivocally addressed 
the fundamental question whether specific agencies possess power to compen-
187. See44 Fed. Reg. 59,174, 59,178 (1979); accord Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 
613 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). 
188. For example, the congressional activity may have been a response to the Comptroller 
General's recommendation that legislative guidance on funding be provided the agencies. See 
Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC, supra note 54. Some of these reasons are articulated by Judge 
Murnaghan in the dissenting opinion in Goyan, 664 F.2d at 1227. 
189. The difficulty is raised only in Goyan and not addressed very explicitly there. See 
Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (4th Cir. 1981). 
190. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
191. Id. at 696. See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 
514, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
192. These are narrow measures, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act or the Magnu-
son-Moss legislation, as opposed to generic regulatory reform legislation. Compare supra notes 69 
& 70 with S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
193. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1229 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, 
J ., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan criticizes the majority's implicit reliance on the maxim expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius and makes a strong policy argument for legislating by implication. It 
may also be argued that if Congress believed agencies lack authority, it would have been 
unnecessary to instruct them not to use appropriated money for funding. 
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sate as a component of their delegated authority .194 Where the legislature has 
sought to bar participant reimbursement, it has always relied upon the appro-
priations process. When Congress indicates in the body of an appropriations 
statute that appropriated funds are not to be used for certain purposes, 
agencies are bound by the legislative restriction although it violates Congress's 
own rules against effecting substantive change in existing legislation through 
appropriations measures.195 The judiciary has honored the constraints im-
posed in fiscal statutes even when they contravene programs specifically au-
thorized in substantive legislation; thus, there can be little question of the 
effect of these limitations on activity undertaken pursuant to powers that are 
less specific. 
The value to be assigned congressional expression in legislative history, 
however, can be problematic. Committee reports and floor debates that ac-
company substantive measures-traditional sources for statutory construc-
tion-command judicial attention, although they do not have the prescriptive 
character of the enactments themselves. Congress, however, has instructed a 
194. All of the statutory prohibitions simply state, without articulating any rationale, that no 
funds appropriated are to be spent on participant reimbursement. Where reasons for the congres-
sional action are provided in the accompanying legislative history, a lack of agency power to 
compensate is generally not one of those expressly articulated. Even when reimbursement author-
ity is explicitly mentioned, other considerations are as well, so that it is simply not possible to 
attribute the legislative action exclusively to Congress's view on the issue of compensation power. 
The proscription imposed upon reimbursement in the appropriations act governing HUD and 
related agencies appears more than any other prohibition to have been based on congressional 
belief that the agencies lacked authority. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The issue of 
agency power, however, was only one of several mentioned during the debate on the Senate floor 
in which the amendment proscribing compensation was adopted. See 126 Cong. Rec. 13,084-86 
(1980). 
195. 
According to its own rules, Congress is not supposed to use appropriations measures as 
vehicles for the amendment of general laws, including revision of expenditure authoriza-
tion. In general, the doctrine disfavoring repeals by implications is said to apply "with 
full vigor" when the subsequent law is an appropriations measure. Where Congress 
chooses to do so, however, we are bound to follow Congress's last word on the matter 
even in an appropriations law. 
City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted); accord United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 
F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied 448 U.S. 907 (1980). See generally Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation 
Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Cath. U.L. Rev. 51, 86-87 (1979), 
and cases cited therein. Although rule 16.4 of the Standing Rules of the Senate provides that no 
amendment that proposes general legislation shall be attached to any general appropriation bill, 
and the House has a similar provision in House rule XXI (2) (both are reproduced in City of Los 
Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 48 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), Congress has, since the nineteenth 
century, followed the general practice of using appropriations measures to set policy. See Fisher, 
supra, at 85. Moreover, Congress has for many years relied upon the funding process to instruct 
agencies that they are not to use appropriated money for purposes authorized by substantive 
statutes. See the statutory provision cited in the classic case of United States v. Dickerson, 310 
U.S. 554 (1940). But see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) ("When voting 
on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the 
funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden."). The 
legislature has twice used appropriations measures to proscribe expenditure of funds for partici-
pant compensation, after specifically empowering agencies to spend for such purposes, see supra 
notes 70 & 82' (EPA) and 74 & 75 (FERC) and accompanying text. 
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number of agencies in legislative materials that attend appropriations acts that 
they are not to pay citizen participants. These directives are entitled to consid-
erably less weight than those that accompany substantive statutes.196 Indeed, 
the Comptroller General "has frequently expressed the view that expressions 
of intent as to spending, contained ... in appropriations committee reports, 
are not legally binding" 197 unless they also appear in actual legislation, and in 
particular has advised agencies that they can compensate public participants 
despite restrictions included in these reports. The Supreme Court itself has 
discounted, albeit with qualifications, the value of these statements of appro-
priations committees.198 The weight assigned should depend on the clarity 
and specificity with which the congressional expressions address the scope of 
agency reimbursement powers-as contrasted with assertions that speak more 
generally to the use of appropriated money-and the extent to which they 
would nullify the letter or spirit of existing legislation. 199 Thus far, proscrip-
tions upon participant compensation imposed in the appropriations process 
have not spoken in terms of agency authority and, therefore, should be 
accorded little weight against a finding that funding power is consistent with 
agency function and substantive legislative mandate. 
Absent specific statutory directive, both general and agency-focused con-
gressional expressions do not provide dispositive guidance for courts. The 
legislative materials are open to multiple interpretations, and, like the Comp-
troller General's opinions and the agency constructions, are elements of lim-
ited value among all of the factors available for consideration. Rather than 
engage in overly mechanical statutory analysis that draws on diffuse, ambigu-
ous, and even contradictory legislative sources, it is preferable to recognize the 
validity of the general implied powers doctrine as applied to the specific 
reimbursement concept and inquire whether participant funding is consistent 
with agency statutory mandates. Where citizen compensation serves to im-
prove the quality of administrative decisionmaking and is in harmony with the 
congressionally defined character and operation of an administrative body, 
the existence of reimbursement authority should be recognized. 
IV. THE REIMBURSEMENT EXPERIENCE 
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for finding compensated public par-
ticipation inherently consistent with administrative mandate is the perform-
196. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
197. Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 60, at 5-6. 
198. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978); see also Rural Electrification 
Admin. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 
(1966) ("demands of Congressional [appropriations] Committees do not have the force of law"). 
199. These factors are drawn from recent decisions treating the specific doctrine of repeal by 
implication. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1978); Preterm, Inc. v. 
Dukakis, 591F.2d121 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). For further discussion of 
this doctrine, see Fisher, supra note 195, at 86-87. The factors also are employed in cases in which 
courts undertake general statutory interpretation. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. 
FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
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ance of reimbursement programs to date. With approximately ten federal 
agencies exercising specific or implied authority to fund public involvement in 
administrative proceedings, the potential for properly conceived and executed 
compensation programs to enhance the administrative process is no longer 
mere speculation. The documented experience of these agencies with the 
reimbursement concept illustrates a variety of ways in which the funded 
participant can contribute to high quality and cost-effective decisionmaking. 
This experience should not only persuade Congress to eliminate appropria-
tions restraints and to sanction a broader range of programs but also convince 
courts that the reimbursement initiatives instituted by agencies themselves are 
legitimate instruments of administrative function. 
Rigorous evaluation of the effect that funded participation has had on 
agency decisionmaking is difficult,200 and not surprisingly a comprehensive 
impact study has yet to be undertaken.201 Problems of definition 202 and 
200. See Rosener, Citizen Participation: Can We Measure Its Effectiveness?, 38 Pub. Ad. 
Rev. 457 (1978); Rosenbaum, Policy Impacts, National Symposium on Citizen Participation (Feb. 
4, 1980), in Citizen Participation: Models and Methods of Evaluation 30 (N. Rosenbaum ed. 
1980) (published by Center for Responsive Governance) (on file in the offices of the Columbia 
Law Review); B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants in Administrative Rulemaking: The 
Federal Trade Commission Experience 97 (June 1980). The Boyer study is a thorough report, 
prepared under the auspices of the Administrative Conference, on activity relating to participant 
compensation at the FTC from 1976 until 1979. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 2307 (1980). There also 
is a condensed version of the report. See Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceed-
ings: The Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 Geo. L.J. 51 (1981). 
201. Even in the FTC study undertaken by Professor Boyer, supra note 200, the efficacy of 
compensation was evaluated comprehensively for only one proceeding. Although several intra-
agency analyses have been performed, either on an agency's own initiative or at the behest of 
Congress, see, e.g., Department of Transportation Demonstration Program to Provide Financial 
Assistance to Participants in Administrative Proceedings: National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration's Evaluations and Recommendations (1977) [hereinafter cited as NHTSA Study) (on 
file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review); Robards, Civil Aeronautics Board Compensated 
Public Participation Program Evaluation (Sept. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CAB Study) (on 
file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review), these were apparently intended to convince 
Congress of the value of compensated involvement and are not objective studies. A few extra-
agency studies of specific proceedings have been undertaken. See, e.g., Noble, Evaluation of 
Energy Policy Task Force Role in DOE Hearings (May 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for 
Professor Roy Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center) (on file in the offices of the 
Columbia Law Review); Stellato & Wright, An Evaluation of Agency Programs for the Reim-
bursement of Participants in Rulemaking Proceedings (May 1981) (same). There is also much 
congressional testimony from both government and private-sector proponents and opponents of 
reimbursed participation. But, in many administrative proceedings in which funded activity has 
occurred no formal evaluation appears to have been conducted. 
202. Defining the concept of efficacy, for example, presents numerous difficulties. One 
criterion might be the notion of "winning," the focus being on how closely the decision adopted 
by the agency resembled the position of those reimbursed. Yet, even this "seemingly straightfor-
ward inquiry presents some practical difficulties," such as ascertaining precisely the positions of 
paid participants and whether those positions were assumed for tactical reasons. See B. Boyer, 
supra note 200, at 133-34. A second, more moderate approach and the one employed in this 
Article, is to ask whether the funded citizen involvement improved the quality of agency decision-
making. For example, did the contribution force the decisionmakers to examine the issues 
presented in a constructive manner, even if the input provided was ultimately rejected? A third 
approach might be to ask whether the compensated participation was of high quality, even if it 
had no effect on the substantive determination. "This approach, however, moves the inquiry even 
farther away from basically objective measures to subjective assessment of the quality of repre-
sentation and the substantive validity of the positions advocated." Id. at 136. 
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measurement, 203 as well as financial constraints, 204 have impeded efforts to 
analyze the performance of reimbursement programs and to gauge their effi-
cacy against alternatives. Nevertheless, both objective data and opinions of 
knowledgeable observers 205 suggest that compensated involvement has had 
positive, identifiable impact on the decisional process. While the pilot pro-
grams have revealed inefficiencies and operational difficulties, many problems 
have proven tractable and those that seem to inhere in the funding mechanism 
do not eclipse the beneficial effects of reimbursement on decisionmaking. 
A. The Benefits of Participant Reimbursement 
The salutary effects of funded involvement have been manifested in 
successive phases of the decisional process, where compensated participants 
have defined and sharpened the issues, interests, and options with which the 
agencies must contend, supplied materials and insights that otherwise might 
not have reached the agencies, assisted the agencies in evaluating the informa-
tion and arguments presented, and contributed to the reasoned and confident 
formulation of administrative determinations. 
1. Setting the Decisional Framework. Officials in a number of agencies 
have commented broadly on the enhanced perspectives provided by funded 
participants. One agency found that its financial assistance program had 
"provid[ed] decisionmakers with a wider understanding of the social, eco-
nomic, environmental, political, and intellectual interests involved in their 
203. "[E]ven a perfect match between [a funded] group's position and the final [decision] 
would not necessarily mean that the group's efforts had caused the agency to adopt that ap-
proach." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 134. For example, the ultimate administrative determina-
tion might be attributable to the advocacy of other participants or to factors unrelated to the 
record made, such as the "policy preferences of the individual [decisionmakers] and the general 
political climate of the times." Id. at 134-35. For further discussion of the difficulties entailed in 
measuring the cause-effect relationship, see id. at 134-36; Rosenbaum, supra note 200, at 46-47. 
204. There appear to be no reliable figures on cost. Professor Boyer estimated that the cost 
of his study "ran well into six figures" but was unable to separate the expense of assessing 
impacts from the cost of analyzing program administration. Telephone Interviews with Barry B. 
Boyer (Nov. 24, 1981) and Michael Bowers of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(Dec. 9, 1981). By contrast, the person who evaluated the CAB program estimated that the study 
cost only $700. Telephone interview with Glen Robards, Jr., Presidential Management Intern, 
CAB Dec. 1, 1981. The CAB study, however, did not approach the breadth and complexity of 
Professor Boyer's analysis of the FTC program. For discussion of other obstacles to rigorous 
evaluation of participant funding programs, see Rosenbaum, supra note 200; Rosener, supra note 
200, at 458-59. 
205. In drawing the conclusions reached in this Article the author surveyed the experiences 
of the ten agencies that have engaged in participant funding. The agencies have reimbursed citizen 
participants in approximately 100 proceedings to perform a broad range of tasks. The available 
studies on participant funding, particularly those that were deemed not to be completely trustwor-
thy, were supplemented with interviews of persons involved in the agency proceedings-presiding 
officers, agency staff, reimbursed participants, and regulated parties-keeping in mind Professor 
Boyer's observations that the "opinions of informed observers may be the best available informa-
tion in this area," B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 133, and that interviews generally are more 
valuable than examination of the record. Telephone interview with Barry B. Boyer, Nov. 24, 
1981. An attempt also was made to assess funded involvement in proceedings that had not been 
evaluated, subject to resource constraints. Some of the general conclusions drawn throughout this 
section reflect confidential material, though all of the specific information may be gleaned from 
the cited sources. 
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decisions," 206 while the head of the FTC declared that citizen reimbursement 
"brought to the Commission table diverse, unique, and important perspec-
tives and interests which enriched [the Commission's] deliberations and con-
tributed substantially to the final shape of the [pending] rule.'' 207 Examples 
of interests whose involvement was made possible by public funding include a 
trade association that provided otherwise unavailable perspectives in FTC 
mobile home hearings,208 and the National Council of Senior Citizens, which 
offered the views and experiences of its members in Commission proceedings 
on hearing aid marketing and regulation. 209 By thus enabling decisionmakers 
to hear directly from a greater number of affected interests, participant 
funding has afforded agencies greater appreciation of the consequences of 
their choices. 
Reimbursed entities have also provided agencies with fresh legal insights, 
both substantive and procedural, that have affected ultimate decisions. The 
contribution of a compensated participant gave content to a statutory reason-
ableness standard and guided HUD in setting utility fee schedules for occu-
pants of public housing. 210 In Department of Transportation hearings on fuel 
economy standards, a funded group suggested that the agency exercise its 
subpoena power to insure receipt of important information from automobile 
manufacturers. 211 Moreover, through both legal and factual argument, com-
pensated parties have focused issues and sharpened analysis, thus improving 
the decisional process. 212 
206. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 1. 
207. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 197 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier). Chairman 
Collier's successor has made similar comments: "The decisionmaking process was enormously 
enriched by the diversity of views that could never have been obtained without Magnuson-Moss 
funding." Id. (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk); see also Regulatory Reform Legislation: 
Hearings on S. 262, S. 755, S. 455, & S. 93 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 378 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) [hereinafter 
cited as S. 262 Hearings]; 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (Administrative Conference recommenda-
tion that the FTC reimbursement program be continued without substantial modification). 
208. See Authorizations for the FTC: Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Subcomm. for 
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 6 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) [hereinafter cited as S. 1020 Hearings]. 
The group provided insights on how the mobile home warranty system worked in practice, with 
perspectives that neither consumer groups nor manufacturers could supply. See generally 40 Fed. 
Reg. 23,334 (1975); 44 Fed. Reg. 53,538 (1979). 
209. See H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier); 
H.R. Rep. No. 134, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1976). Funding of the senior citizen group in the 
hearing aid proceeding is documented in B. Boyer, supra note 200, at app. A. See generally 40 
Fed. Reg. 26,646 (1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 43,867 (1977). 
210. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 169 (statement of Mass. Lieutenant Governor 
Thomas O'Neill III). The party was able to persuade HUD that the Department's formulas would 
impose an excessive burden on public housing tenants, and as a result, HUD increased utility 
charges by only five percent as opposed to the thirty-five percent increase originally contemplated. 
211. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 10. See generally 49 C.F.R. Pt. 531 (1981) (NHTSA). 
212. 
[T]here's not been an occasion in which they didn't sharpen the analysis .... 
[T]hey did confuse me with the facts, which was a good thing. And they confused me 
with analysis. But out of that confusion, out of that conflict, out of this adversary 
system it seems we get more informed decisionmaking. 
S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 14-15 (statement of FTC Commissioner Pitofsky); see also 
id. at 7 (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk). 
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2. Supplying Information. Financially assisted participants have provided 
agencies with information that had not previously reached them. For example, 
at the urging of a reimbursed group the BP A included an exemption in its 
regulation governing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) for the chemical's use 
in microscopy. The agency had not previously been aware that PCB's were 
employed in this manner.213 The same funded group, participating in pro-
ceedings on materials that include asbestos, informed the CPSC of an ex-
tremely hazardous, asbestos-containing product commercially available to 
artists.214 More generally, agency officials have testified that compensated 
participants "have developed information, proposed evidence and conducted 
surveys ... which have added materially to the quality of the [administrative 
records]," 215 and have assisted decisionmakers in more effectively managing 
those records. 216 
3. Suggesting Alternative Methodology and Analysis. In a number of 
instances, reimbursed parties have proposed superior methods of testing and 
evaluation or have exposed deficiencies in the reasoning of agencies or other 
entities. A funded participant in the NHTSA proceeding involving use of 
vehicle child restraints suggested a testing technique not considered by the 
agency staff.217 A compensated individual challenged the validity of scientific 
studies submitted to the FDA in support of a petition for approval of the food 
additive aspartame. The Board of Public Inquiry serving as the initial agency 
decisionmaker agreed that the submitted data did not eliminate the possibility 
that the additive caused tumors in laboratory animals, and that the evidence 
213. See Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PCB Public 
Participation Pilot Summary (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA Study] (on file in the offices of the 
Columbia Law Review); 40 C.F.R. § 761.31(k) (1981). The regulation as initially proposed 
appears at 43 Fed. Reg. 24,802 (1978). See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F. 
2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
214. Memorandum: Funding Under 1980 Public Participation Program (not including§ 7) 2 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CPSC Study] (on file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review). But 
see Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 21 ("[p]erhaps the only real reliance on [the compensated 
group's] information by CPSC [was] exhibited by the placement of 'kilns' on the list of products 
involved in the CPSC order for information"). 
Novel input also appears to have been generated in the FfC's food advertising rulemaking. 
Staff attorneys in that proceeding observed that a funded entity "submitted an impressive written 
analysis of the rule's energy and calorie sections presenting evidence ... not considered by the 
staff." H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FfC Chairman Collier); cf. 1 
C.F.R. § 305.79-5 (1981) (reimbursement can broaden sources of information presented in 
proceedings). See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 23,086 (1975); 43 Fed. Reg. 11,834 (1978). 
215. S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of James DeLong, Assistant Director, 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection). In interviews with Professor Boyer, the FfC "Commis-
sioners pointed out some of the benefits they saw from the public participation program: it ... 
gave the Commissioners more confidence that they were deciding on the basis of a complete 
record." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 144; see also S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 177, 197 
(statements of NHTSA Administrator Claybrook). 
216. See Hearings on S. 1020, supra note 208, at 28 (statement of FrC Commissioner 
Clanton); id. at 7 (statement ofFfC Chairman Pertschuk); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 197 
(same); Hearings on S. 262, supra note 207, at 401 (same). 
217. See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 72,131 (1979). 
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suggested that aspartame might induce tumors. 218 A reimbursed participant 
in Department of Energy hearings on heating oil deregulation provided the 
most accurate model depicting refinery overcharges, 219 improved on agency 
measurement techniques by employing alternative base data, 220 and persuaded 
the decisionmaker that a Justice Department analysis suggesting the existence 
of industry competition was erroneous. 221 
4. Proposing Courses of Action and Facilitating Decisions. Funded entit-
ies have also suggested alternative, less onerous, and occasionally novel, ways 
to achieve administrative objectives. For example, at the urging of compen-
sated participants, the CPSC decided to devise mandatory safety standards 
for unvented gas space heaters, rather than ban the devices as initially contem-
plated.222 In FTC proceedings on consumer protection in the purchase of 
used cars, the agency staff had originally proposed a very detailed set of 
disclosures. A reimbursed group, however, conducted a survey that demon-
strated consumer preference for simple disclosures, and the staff revised its 
recommendations to incorporate the group's suggestions.223 An unusual, but 
effective course of action was proposed by a funded individual in CPSC 
hearings on home insulation materials. The participant, who had become ill 
after urea-formaldehyde foam was installed in his home, reported that physi-
cians were initially unable to diagnose his condition and urged that the Com-
mission bring appropriate diagnostic information to the attention of the 
medical community.224 Acting on this advice, the agency staff contacted the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, which subsequently published 
an article on the formaldehyde-associated disorder. 225 
218. See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285, 38,286 (1981). For documentation of the participant funding, 
see Smith, Preliminary Assessment of the FDA's Pilot Public Reimbursement Program§ 5 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as FDA Study] (on file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review). The FDA 
Commissioner who was the final decisionmaker observed that in the "hearing before the Public 
Board of Inquiry, the first of its kind to be convened, the scientific issues presented •.• were 
intellectually complex and carried wide ranging public health ramifications" and that the "Board 
performed admirably in maintaining a judicial decorum and in crystalizing its views of the issues 
in its Initial Decision." Id. at 38,289. Nonetheless, the Commissioner disagreed with the Board in 
what can be fairly characterized as a "close" decision. 
219. Decision and Recommendations No. 2 (Home) Heating Oil, Department of Energy, 
Office of Hearings and Appeals 84 (Nov. 29, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OHA Decision] (on file in 
the offices of the Columbia Law Review). DOE apparently never adopted the OHA recommenda· 
tions. For comprehensive analysis of the OHA proceedings, see Noble, supra note 201. 
220. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 81. In the NHTSA proceeding on fuel economy 
standards, a reimbursed participant used "different input asumptions" to introduce "important 
challenges to the assumptions made by the Model" being employed. NHTSA Study, supra note 
201, at 11. 
221. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 126. OHA also relied upon the policy reasons 
enunciated by a witness for the compensated organization in deciding that "anti-trust remedies 
[were] not likely to be successful in resolving competitive problems in the refining industry." Id. 
at 132. 
222. CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880, 61,882 (1980). 
223. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 228 (statement of Nancy Drabble). See generally 46 
Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981). Congress subsequently vetoed these regulations, 127 Cong. Rec. 
S5371-402 (daily ed. May 18, 1982); H.2856-83 (daily ed. May 26, 1982). 
224. CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. As a result of the witness's testimony, CPSC "staff 
is preparing general information on formaldehyde and UF foam for distribution to all state health 
departments." Id. 
225. 243 J.A.M.A. 1697 (1980). See generally 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366 (1982). 
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Even where the input of compensated parties has not altered the agency's 
views or contemplated course of action, it has fostered improved decision-
making. Comments that have been "well reasoned and favorable to the 
agency's position" 226 have given the agency added assurance of its propriety 
and lent support to the agency approach. Contributions that have challenged 
the administrative perspective have kept the agencies honest, requiring rea-
soned responses, forcing staff to do their homework, and preventing decision-
makers from accomodating regulated interests too readily.227 While the enu-
merated benefits are not unique to reimbursed participation-they also accrue 
from the unfunded involvement of interested parties 228-compensation has 
drawn more interests into the administrative forum, especially those formerly 
excluded, and has enhanced the quality of agency decisionmaking.-229 
B. The Identified Deficiencies 
There have also been negative experiences with participant reimburse-
ment. Understandably, less documentation of this aspect of funding exists, 
because agencies, seeking to secure continued congressional support, have no 
interest in emphasizing program shortfalls. Moreover, only a small number of 
extra-agency analyses are available, and critics have focused upon deficiencies 
in the administration of programs, rather than substantive inadequacies.230 
Nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that some compensated participants 
have made minimal contributions or have provided misleading input, 231 so 
226. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 2. 
227. See the testimony of FfC Chairman Pertschuk and NHTSA Administrator Claybrook 
in S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 174-200. 
228. See, e.g., NRC Report, supra note 28; Public Participation Study, supra note 17; 
Gellhorn, supra note 6; Cramton, supra note 8; Note, supra note 8; S. Rep. No. 863, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1976). 
229. The positive contributions to decisionmaking made by reimbursed participants can have 
ancillary benefits for the decisional process as well. For example, efficacious funded activity 
"may save the agency from serious substantive error and from serious delay," thus yielding 
concomitant savings in time, money, and effort. See NRC Report, supra note 28, app. F at 7 
(statement of Malcolm Mason), reprinted in Chambers, Increasing Citizen Participation in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings: Can Federal Financing Bridge the Costs Barrier?, 30 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 33, 67 (1979); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 189 (statement of NHTSA Administrator 
Claybrook); cf. S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 18, 122 (statements of United States District 
Judge Richey & EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus) (reimbursement would expedite administrative 
process by reducing number of appeals taken from agency action); S. 270 Hearings, supra note 
18, at 90 (statement of Anthony Reisman) (reimbursement would expedite proceedings by provid-
ing citizens with resources to present affirmative case rather than having to rely upon procedural 
devices such as discovery and cross-examination). 
230. See, e.g., S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 200-24 (statements of Ben Blackburn, 
Daniel Popeo, and Richard Leighton); Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 265-68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FfC Oversight Hearings] 
(statement of Jeffrey Joseph). 
231. It seems fair to surmise that nothing of consequence occurred in a number of proceed-
ings, because compensated involvement in them was deemed insufficiently worthwhile to warrant 
inclusion in agency self-evaluations generally prepared as advocacy documents. Indeed, NHTSA 
apparently could find so little efficacious funded involvement in its proceedings that the adminis-
tration neglected to submit a report on its program as mandated by H.R. Rep. No. 1329, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978). 
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that reimbursement has not invariably improved the quality of agency deci-
sionmaking, and that funding has not always brought previously uninvolved 
interests into the administrative forum. 232 
1. Duplicative and Flawed Input. The charges most frequently leveled at 
compensated involvement are that the submissions of some funded partici-
pants have been redundant or of inferior quality. Reimbursed parties have 
offered information, methodologies, or arguments supplied by other entities 
or generated by an agency's own staff. NHTSA probably would have learned 
of all the problems widely discussed in a public meeting on truck safety, save 
one, without funding a single participant, 233 and CAB staff contended that an 
economic assessment performed by a compensated expert in the International 
Air Transport Association hearing added nothing to the analysis provided by 
the agency's own economic witnesses.234 Moreover, reimbursed parties have 
often adopted positions similar to those of the agencies.235 Compensated 
entities sometimes have not been good sources of original scientific or techni-
cal data236 and have occasionally provided inaccurate technical input. The 
NHTSA observed that funded participants in its fuel economy standards 
initiative failed to present extensive facts documenting their opinions237 and 
that a reimbursed organization's analysis of the comparative effectiveness of 
different types of automobile restraints was "demonstrably incorrect in major 
respects." 238 Surveys conducted by two compensated parties in an FTC 
rulemaking were found to be deficient239 and the Department of Energy 
232. Analysis of the bad experiences does not depreciate the merits of the reimbursement 
enterprise, and indeed most of the difficulties encountered could reasonably have been antici-
pated. It is important, however, to identify those problems that are attributable to inexperience 
with an untested concept and those that are the fixed costs of what may otherwise be a profitable 
undertaking. 
233. Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 27. 
234. Memorandum from Competition Maintenance Division to Glen Robards, Jr., Jan. 15, 
1980, in CAB Study, supra note 201. One explanation for this may be that the procedural rules 
applied in the particular proceeding apparently changed considerably in the course of that 
proceeding. Telephone interview with Cornish Hitchcock, Attorney for Aviation Consumer 
Action Project (Aug. 6, 1981). See generally International Air Transport Ass'n, CAB Order No. 
81-5-27 (May 6, 1981). 
235. See, e.g., S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 158 (statement of Senator Simpson); FI'C 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 277 (statement of Jeffrey Joseph). 
236. "[C]onsumer groups, often in an adversary posture toward industry, tend to have the 
least experience of all. Though they may appeal to competing elements within industry for help, 
they frequently are dependent upon the agency and outside experts for information." Breyer, 
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv. 
L. Rev. 549, 572 (1979); see also FI'C Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155 (statement of 
Senator Danforth); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 159 (statement of Senator Simpson). The 
mere fact that entities Jack substantive expertise, however, does not necessarily mean that they will 
be ineffective. Professor Boyer and FI'C Chairman Pertschuk have praised the funded participa-
tion of the Americans for Democratic Action in the FI'C opthalmic goods and funeral practices 
rulemakings. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 142; S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 6-7. See 
generally American Optometric Ass'n v. FI'C, 626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 
(1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 41,651 (1977). 
237. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 11. 
238. Id. at 13. Nevertheless, NHTSA observed that the "analysis provided the agency with 
the opportunity to rebute [sic] decisively the position of those opposed to air bags." Id. 
239. See FI'C Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155 (statement of Senator Danforth). 
See generally 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710 (1981). 
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concluded that one model for heating oil overcharges presented by a funded 
group was significantly flawed. 240 
2. Failure to Expand the Participant Base. Reimbursement programs 
have been criticized as well for failing to achieve their full pluralistic promise. 
Government compensation has not always brought new voices to the deci-
sional process. Some support has been paid to entities that had participated in 
prior proceedings without assistance. 241 Little funding has reached grassroots 
groups and individuals, 242 and a considerable amount of money has been 
awarded to a small number of recipients, often involved in multiple proceed-
ings before the same agency. 243 
This information raises questions that go to the essence of the compensa-
tion rationale. Concentration of funding in a few participants jeopardizes the 
desired appearance of administrative openness and sacrifices the democratic 
ideal underlying the reimbursement concept for perceived technical compe-
tence. 244 Compensating parties that can pay their own way245 violates both 
the spirit of the funding idea and the letter of the law governing agency 
reimbursement. 
240. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 83. 
While there is no indication that erroneous data submitted by funded participants has been 
relied upon in reaching a final decision, at the very least nominal or negative contributions impose 
delay on the administrative proceedings. Indeed, a principal objection to institution of the 
reimbursement concept has been that compensated participants will cause delay. See, e.g., S. 270 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 113-14 (statement of William Cuddy); H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra 
note 93, at 630-31 (statement of George Gleason). Even where the participation of funded parties 
is ostensibly efficacious, that participation-by "multiplying the range of interests that must be 
considered, by underscoring the complexity of the issues involved, and by developing a more 
complete record of alternatives and competing considerations"-actually "may reduce the extent 
to which procedures will effectively control agency discretion in decisionmaking." Stewart, supra 
note 5, at 1777. 
241. Examples are the Center for Auto Safety at NHTSA and the Aviation Consumer Action 
Project at CAB. See NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 12; CAB Study, supra note 201, at 3. 
242. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 125. Professor Boyer also found that a considerable 
number of compensated entities were located in Washington, D.C., or California. Id.; see also 
FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 154 (statement of Senator Danforth). 
243. Professor Boyer found that "to some degree, the statistics bear out the contention that 
compensation awards have been relatively concentrated in a few applicants" at the FTC. B. 
Boyer, supra note 200, at 125; see also FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 158-60 
(statement of Senator Simpson). There has been some, but considerably less, concentration of 
funding at a few other agencies. See, e.g., NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 4-6. It is often 
claimed as well that the entities in which reimbursement has been concentrated have espoused the 
agency's position in the proceeding for which compensation was granted. Professor Boyer 
observed that "if the [FTC] compensation program was designed to achieve a balance of pro-rule 
and anti-rule witnesses, it seems to have had little effect." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 116. 
Numerous witnesses before congressional committees have testified that "funds were disbursed in 
many instances, to specific individuals or groups in agreement with the [agency's] position" and 
in rare circumstances to regulated interests. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 280 (statement of 
Richard Leighton). 
244. An important theme in Professor Boyer's article is the fundamental tension between 
democracy and technocracy. See B. Boyer, supra note 200. 
245. Opponents of participant funding have been particularly critical of awards to groups 
with extensive membership, who it is said, should have sufficient resources to pay the cost of their 
participation. See FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 154 (statement of Senator Dan-
forth); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 280 (statement of Richard Leighton). The critics have 
also alleged that certain small groups have been formed exclusively for the purpose of securing 
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C. The Problems in Perspective 
1. The Refinements. It obviously is difficult to choose applicants whose 
contributions will most improve administrative decisionmaking. There are 
measures the agencies can take, and have implemented, to improve both the 
quality and diversity of compensated participation. Duplication 246 can be 
curtailed by apprising reimbursed entities of the materials that are possessed 
by the agencies or that have been, or are likely to be, submitted by other 
parties. Timing participant awards,247 so that the parties chosen have adequate 
opportunity to prepare without unduly delaying the proceedings, is a logistical 
problem that the agencies have tried to solve. 248 Agencies that have not 
always been sufficiently rigorous in auditing recipients can, and are attempt-
ing to, upgrade their oversight. 249 The selection process can be expected to 
improve as experience with funding programs accumulates. These improve-
ments not only should enhance the quality of compensated contributions but 
also can broaden the spectrum of viewpoints that participant funding could 
elicit. As the Administrative Conference, commenting on the FTC compensa-
tion effort, has observed, "reimbursement programs are likely to be most 
public reimbursement monies. See FfC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155, 161 (state-
ments of Senators Danforth & Simpson). Moreover, it often has been alleged that few of the 
recipients selected actually represent the public. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 157, 214 
(statements of Senator Simpson and Ben Blackburn); FfC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 
153 (statement of Senator Danforth). 
246. The NHTSA meeting on heavy-duty truck safety discussed supra in text accompanying 
note 233 is illustrative. Many participants were funded to talk about safety problems without 
being apprised of what other participants might say. It is not surprising, therefore, that considera-
ble duplication occurred. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 25-28. Duplication of the 
agency's position may also be a consequence of the structure of the proceedings. The confusion 
that results when the procedural rules are changed may mislead a funded participant into 
duplicating the efforts of agency staff. See supra note 234. In certain rulemaking proceedings, the 
procedures by which substantive regulations are developed may make it "unrealistic to expect that 
public participation ... [will] produce anything beyond modest expansion or contraction of rule 
coverage." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 135. Also, the agency staff may already have developed 
an excellent proposal and may only be funding participants to ascertain whether it might be 
improved. This may well be what happened in the asbestos proceeding discussed supra in note 214 
and accompanying text. In the latter situation funding may be ill-advised. 
247. NHTSA's experience indicated that "[w]ithout sufficient time to prepare, the contribu-
tions of [funded participants] are generally limited by the complexity of the ideas involved in the 
proceeding." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 3. As to the FfC, see B. Boyer, supra note 200, 
at 86; see also 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-5 (1981). For thorough exploration of the timing difficulties, see 
B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 86-88. 
248. The time frames for applicant selection included in most regulations are illustrative. 
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b) (1981) (USDA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.210(a), 10.215(a), (d), (e), I0.220(a), 
(c) (1981) (FDA). Some agencies have even made explicit provision for expedited procedures in 
extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., id. at § I0.210(a)(l) (FDA). 
249. The "financial auditing aspects of the FfC's compensation program appeared to be 
fairly well established by the middle of 1979." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 95; accord S. 104 
Hearings, supra note 94, at 194 (statement of FfC Chairman Pertschuk). The experience of other 
agencies seems similar, but most acted more expeditiously than the Commission. See generally 
NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 6-7; EPA Study, supra note 213. Agency sponsorship of, and 
participation in, the national symposium on citizen participation mentioned supra in note 200, as 
well as the substantive content of the papers presented at the conference, indicate that agencies 
can refine the quality of auditing recipient performance to ensure that promised input has been 
provided. 
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valuable in agencies or proceedings where there is a substantial difference 
between the positions of the agency staff and groups seeking reimburse-
ment." 250 Giving funding preference to responsible opponents of agency 
positions should minimize duplication and make compensated involvement 
more diverse. 251 
The agencies can also attempt to decrease the concentration of funding 
grants. The initial experience of some agencies that awarded assistance to a 
small group of recipients is partially attributable to failure to publicize fund-
ing availability.252 Concentration can be reduced by implementing, as some 
agencies have, outreach programs to inform potentially qualified parties of 
250. 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (FfC). 
251. The criticisms referred to supra in note 243 notwithstanding, most funded participants 
have in fact opposed agency positions. Even in the FTC proceedings, in which especially in the 
early days of the program funded consumer groups seem to have allied with the Commission 
staff, "the great majority of aid recipients have opposed staff proposals in one way or another." 
B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 132; see also l C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (FTC); H.R. 3361 Hearings, 
supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 176 
(statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk); S.1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 14 (same). Individ-
uals and groups compensated by other agencies have almost always challenged the perspectives 
advocated by staff. NHTSA has observed that the "points of view expressed by the funded 
participants are generally independent of the agency's views, and may conflict with or criticize the 
positions of the agency and the industry." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 2. More specifically, 
the recipient of the largest sum awarded by the FDA was known to be a vociferous opponent of 
the perspective of the Bureau of Foods in the aspartame matter, see supra note 218 and accompa-
nying text, and may have been selected for that very reason. 
In certain instances, congruity between agency views and those of funded participants may 
have resulted from bias in the selection process. For example, some evidence suggests that, during 
the early period of experimentation with funding at the FTC, staff working on the substantive 
matter for which reimbursement was requested may have influenced the compensation determina-
tion. In other agencies as well, officials charged with selecting funding applicants have consulted 
staff involved in the initiative for which funding was sought, because the staff have often been the 
best sources of information about the particular proceeding. This contact is not altogether 
harmful, and indeed some such communication may be necessary. B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 
79-81; 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FTC). To guard against improper intra-agency influence in the 
selection process while allowing for some interaction, a few agencies have isolated decisionmakers 
from staff and have required decisionmakers to secure information about the substantive proceed-
ing from presiding officers. Funding responsibility can be placed in the agency head. See, e.g., 15 
C.F.R. § 904 (1981) (NOAA). Alternatively, the presiding officer can serve in a recommendatory 
capacity with final decisionmaking authority vested in entities such as the Office of General 
Counsel or a three-person Evaluation Board. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § l.17(d) (1981) (FfC); 21 
C.F.R. §§ 10.215-20 (1981) (FDA); cf. 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.2, 12.5 (1981) (head of each USDA 
component presents analysis to Evaluation Board). The FDA approach was to disqualify Evalua-
tion Board members who were participating in the substantive proceeding. See 21 C.F.R. § 
10.220(a) (1981). If necessary, agencies could promulgate rules governing inappropriate contacts, 
such as those that enforce "separation of functions." See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.55(c) (1981) 
(FDA); cf. S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 13 (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) (FfC 
staff directed to avoid efforts to intervene improperly in funding decision); see also CAB Study, 
supra note 201, at 7. 
A more extreme approach would be to place responsibility for choosing funding recipients in 
the hands of a government body outside the agency, but the Administrative Conference has 
recommended that funding responsibility remain with the agencies. 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) 
(FfC). 
252. As to the FTC, see B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 83-86. A similar situation prevailed at 
other agencies. For example, CPSC received few applications immediately after the program was 
instituted, primarily because the Commission failed to publicize the program. Interview with Alan 
Shakin, Office of General Counsel, CPSC, Feb. 3, 1981. 
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their eligibility for financial assistance253 or by de-emphasizing prior adminis-
trative advocacy as a participant selection criterion. 254 
2. The Constraints. There are limits, however, to the efficacy and desir-
ability of measures that could be instituted to remedy the perceived deficien-
cies in compensation programs. The inherent cost of eliciting contributions 
from entities lacking the expertise and experience of regulated interests or 
agency staffs is that some of the funded participation will be mediocre or even 
faulty.255 It is, moreover, unrealistic to expect that every reimbursed party 
will offer new insights.256 The crucial issue is not that there may be inferior 
input, but its extent and the degree to which it offsets the advantages of 
compensation. Thus far, experience demonstrates and administrative opinion 
indicates that the funding experiments have been worthwhile; a realistic atti-
tude towards the reimbursement concept requires acceptance of its attendant 
functional costs. 
Distributing compensation awards among diverse interests is certainly 
desirable. Where pursuit of that goal conflicts with the need to secure accu-
rate, reliable, comprehensive, and cost-effective input, however, it may be 
necessary to compromise the ideal of the broadest based participation. Often 
the pool of qualified potential participants familiar with a particular agency's 
concerns is small.257 As Professor Boyer has observed, "if the purpose [of 
the funding programs] is to produce testimony based on sound research and 
expert legal representation, then it seems efficient to prefer groups and law-
yers who already know the ropes and have demonstrated their competence in 
prior proceedings." 258 There is economic gain as well as an assurance of 
253. As to the FfC, see B. Boyer, supra note 207, at 85. An agency such as the FDA, that 
attracted few applicants during more than two years of operation despite admirable attempts at 
publicizing the program, may need to expand efforts or develop new approaches. For helpful 
suggestions on encouraging participation, see 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FfC). 
254. ·see, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.6(d) (1981) (USDA); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (FfC); see B. 
Boyer, supra note 200, at 131. Restrictions might also be placed on the amount of the award to 
any one participant, as Congress has done in FfC proceedings. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(l)(c) 
(Supp. IV 1980). 
255. Even substantively ineffective participation can be helpful. For example, FfC Commis-
sioner Pitofsky offered the following remarks about compensated participants: "I would say in 
most instances, their position did not prevail. And yet there's not been an occasion in which they 
didn't sharpen the analysis .•• at times, their positions may be extreme, but they expose 
considerations that would not otherwise come to the surface." S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, 
at 15; cf. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 13 (existence of funded party's analysis that was 
"demonstrably incorrect in major respects" provided agency with opportunity to rebut position 
of those opposed to airbags). And, there may be value in simply having previously unrepresented 
interests participate in administrative proceedings, enhancing the perception of a democratic 
process. 
256. Perhaps all that can fairly be asked of reimbursed entities is that they effectively present 
their views to agency decisionmakers. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 136. Professor Boyer, in 
assessing the "quality of representation provided by the compensated groups" at the FfC found 
that the "compensated consumer groups made a respectable showing." Id. at 143, 145. The 
remarks of the Administrative Conference were considerably stronger. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 
(1981) (FfC); see also NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 1 (compensated entities "were able to 
make a·meaningful contribution"). 
257. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 130 & n.300 and sources cited therein. 
258. Id. at 129. 
1982] PUBLIC FUNDS 951 
quality in selecting experienced applicants, whose start-up and operational 
costs are generally lower and who can use materials and methods developed in 
other proceedings. 259 A balance must be struck between experience and 
diversity, and such factors as the size of the qualified applicant pool and the 
technical complexity of the issues will affect the determination of whether to 
choose the neophyte or the practiced participant. 
It may also be necessary to compromise when scrutinizing the fiscal 
condition of applicants, reviewing the performance of those selected, and 
assessing the quality of program administration. To maintain the integrity of 
reimbursement efforts, agencies must enforce standards of financial eligibil-
ity, 260 monitor recipient input,261 and analyze program operation. But per-
formance of these tasks is costly. While eligibility criteria can be refined, there 
are limits to the resources that an agency should devote to examining applicant 
need and to determining how far an agency should delve into the private 
financial affairs of funding applicants. 262 Financial ability tests must eventu-
ally become questions of credibility and reasonableness, 263 and undeserving 
entities may occasionally secure an award.264 Evaluating the substantive 
contributions of individual compensated parties and the administration of 
funding programs is both difficult and expensive.265 During the initial stages 
of operation, less rigorous study that still affords a general sense of reimburse-
259. Id., citing Galanter, Afterward: Explaining Litigation, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 347 (1975), 
and Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & 
Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974). With respect to the FfC, whose proceedings require considerable partici-
pant expertise, the Administrative Conference concluded: "[T]he fact that a relatively small 
number of participants received substantial compensation in several proceedings does not demon-
strate a defect in the design or implementation of the program." 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-l{c) (1981). 
260. The eligibility formulas used in the funding programs focus on the inability of appli-
cants to finance their participation as well as the substantiality of their proposed contributions. 
See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 904.3(a) (1981) (NOAA); 7 C.F.R. § 21.5(d) (1981) (USDA); 21 C.F.R. § 
10.220(c)(3) (1981) (FDA). For comprehensive discussion of the criteria, see Chambers, supra 
note 229, at 40-44, 49-53; B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 10-73. 
261. Agency regulations provide for denial of claims for payment or recovery of money paid 
where the entity whose application was approved initially "has not provided the representation 
for which the application was approved." 7 C.F.R. § 12.8(b) (1981) (USDA); accord 21 C.F.R. § 
10.280(c) (1981) (FDA). But, it is not clear how agencies would determine that contributions were 
not as promised. Even if agency officials could objectively gauge substandard performance, they 
may be reluctant to commit agency resources to litigation over claim denial or payment recovery. 
262. "Conceptually, applying the financial inability standard involves two related inquir-
ies-does the applicant have enough resources to participate now, and does it have workable ways 
of raising additional money-that are likely to be both sensitive and beyond the expertise of an 
agency like the FfC." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 65. For further discussion of the problem of 
governmental intrusion, see id. at 65-68, 70-73; 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FfC). 
263. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 108. "Considering these many problems," Professor 
Boyer concluded, "the FfC was reasonable in according a relatively minor role to the financial 
inability standard, and in accepting at face value applicants' assertions of financial need." Id. 
"Other agencies operating direct funding programs appear to have adopted similar approaches." 
Id. 
264. Critics of funding often cite Consumers Union, which is allegedly a "$20 million 
operation." S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 203 (statement of Richard Leighton}; S. 270 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 9-10 (statement of Senator Thurmond). The FfC has also funded 
trade associations. B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 102-03. 
265. See supra notes 202 & 204. 
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ment's efficacy may be preferable, so that agency resources more profitably 
used to fund participants or administer programs will not be dissipated. 
3. Operational Costs. An important factor to be considered in examining 
the legitimacy and desirability of participant compensation is its cost, both in 
terms of money actually paid recipients and of the administrative demands on 
agency staff and resources. Experience has demonstrated that the benefits of 
reimbursement programs have been attained with relatively little strain on 
agency budget or bureaucracy. The programs have proven inexpensive and 
easy to administer and have generally been operated in a competent man-
ner, 266 although citizen funding began as, and remains, an experimental idea. 
Perhaps more significantly, the expenses of administration and financial as-
sistance have been reasonably contained. Start-up costs, attributable to 
promulgation of rules creating programs and publicity, have been rather 
low, 267 and can be expected to decline as agencies instituting compensation 
efforts capitalize on the experience of those that have previously developed 
programs. 268 Day-to-day administrative expenses have also been reason-
able, 269 because the skills and personnel needed to run the efforts already exist 
within the agencies 270 and because experience brings cost efficiency. 
The primary program costs have been, of course, the actual money paid 
to participants, but here too outlay has been modest. Only the FTC has spent 
266. The Administrative Conference, in recommending that the FTC effort continue, ob-
served that even though the Commission "lack[ed] specific statutory guidance and the benefit of 
other agencies' experience, [and] progressed slowly, through trial and error over a two-year 
period, ... [the] Commission's present system of administration appears to implement faithfully 
and efficiently the reimbursement program established by the statute." I C.F.R. § 305.79-5 
(1981). NHTSA found that its program could "be administered with only minor administrative 
burdens so long as it is adequately staffed." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 3; accord CAB 
Study, supra note 201, at I, 7. 
267. For example, the CAB estimated that it paid "$38,325 to complete the rulemaking [and] 
$7,053 to develop a pamphlet explaining the application process." CAB Study, supra note 201, at 
6, 9. All of the CAB figures include a "IOOo/o overhead factor." Id. at 9. The attorney who 
developed the CPSC funding regulation stated that the "start-up" effort required a "small 
amount of resources." Telephone interview with Alan Shakin, Office of General Counsel, CPSC, 
Dec. I, 1981. The attorney who developed the NHTSA regulation estimated expenditures to be 
"$50,000 maximum." Telephone interview with Richard Lorr, Office of General Counsel, DOT, 
Dec. I, 1981. Start-up costs appear to be no more than those incurred in commencing other 
similar programs. 
268. A number of the agencies appear to have drawn on the experience of other agencies in 
structuring their own programs. Compare 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.200-.290 (1981) (FDA) and 7 C.F.R. 
pt. 12 (1981) (USDA) with 15 C.F.R. pt. 904 (1981) (NOAA). 
269. The cost of day-to-day administration at the CAB during a nine-month period was 
approximately $2,600, representing the expense incurred by the Evaluation Committee in process-
ing eight applications submitted in three proceedings. CAB Study, supra note 201, at 9. This does 
not include approximately $700 spent in evaluating the program staff or salary allocated to the 
program. Telephone interview with Glen Robards, Jr. (Nov. 24, 1981). The CPSC spent approxi-
mately $20,700 to administer its effort during the final year of operation. This included the costs 
of processing more than fifty applications submitted in three proceedings. Interview with Barbara 
Rosenfeld, Office of Public Participation, CPSC (Nov. 24, 1981). 
270. For example, FDA has relied upon personnel in its Office of Management and Opera-
tions to process applications and conduct fiscal audits, skills that the personnel had acquired in 
processing and auditing grant applications. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 10.280-.290 (1981) (FDA); 
FDA Study, supra note 218, at§ 2. 
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more than $65,000 on compensation during a single year,271 and most agencies 
have paid out considerably less than they had originally allocated.272 The cost 
of funding specific parties has been comparatively inexpensive, substantially 
below the market rate for similar private-sector services.273 Indeed, in many 
situations, citizen reimbursement appears cheaper than the alternative mecha-
nisms-augmenting agency staff and hiring outside contractors-traditionally 
employed to procure additional decisional input. 274 Public participants can 
be paid to provide assistance in substantive fields where the agency does not 
"want to build up the kind of permanent staff expertise that [it] would have to 
have to issue intelligent regulations." 275 Because most applicants funded are 
already involved in, and knowledgeable about, their areas of particular con-
cern and because they are highly motivated, 276 they are also willing and able to 
charge much less than government contractors.277 
271. In 1977, NHTSA paid $63,389 in fees and expenses. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 
6. Most other agencies have expended considerably less. For example, FDA spent approximately 
$7,300 during a six-month period. See FDA Study, supra note 218, Table II. CPSC spent 
approximately $25,000 for fees and expenses during the final year that its program was operating. 
See CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. The FTC, however, has paid participants as much as 
$500,000 for fees and expenses in one year. Telephone interview with Barry Rubin, Office of 
General Counsel, FTC, Nov. 23, 1981. 
272. For example, FDA allocated $250,000 for the initial year and paid only $7,300 in the 
first half of that period. See FDA Study, supra note 218, at 3 & Table II. Similarly, the CAB spent 
only $28,400 of the $150,000 appropriated for a one-year demonstration project. See CAB Study, 
supra note 201, at 1-2. Moreover, some agencies have actually paid less money than was initially 
awarded recipients. For example, NHTSA awarded $56,000 and "only had to pay $43,000" in 
1978. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 189 (statement ofNHTSA Administrator Claybrook); see 
also NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 6. 
273. Many agencies have paid attorneys according to a "fee scale extrapolated from govern-
ment lawyers' salaries which [have] sliding maximum limits based on the attorney's years of 
experience after law school." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 91. Similarly, many agencies have 
"pegged" the rate for expert witnesses to salaries paid government employees with comparable 
experience. On compensation levels in specific funding programs, see 21 C.F.R. § 10.250-.280 
(1981) (FDA); 15 C.F.R. § 904.5(c) (1981) (NOAA); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1977) (FTC). 
274. It may also be cheaper than some of the other proposals considered by Congress in the 
early 1970's to provide increased consumer representation in agency proceedings, such as "the 
creation of special 'public counsels' in certain areas which affect all citizens ... [or] of an 
independent 'Public Counsel Corporation,' to provide advocacy on a broad spectrum of issues." 
S. Rep. No. 94-863, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). Strengthening existing consumer offices, see S. 
104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 279 (statement of Richard Leighton), would probably be less 
costly, but also less effective. For discussion of these and other less effective alternatives, see NRC 
Report, supra note 28, at 131-67. 
275. Hearings on Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 
1980 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. pt. 6, at 287 (1979) (statement of Reuben Robertson, CAB Bureau of Consumer 
Protection Director); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) ("direct utilization 
of •.. consumer expertise and resources will enable CPSC to 'bootstrap' its staff on the technical 
matters, which should result in higher quality standards"). 
276. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 188 (statement of NHTSA Administrator 
Claybrook). 
277. For example, a consumer center "received $2,486 to provide information on the 
hazards related to the presence of asbestos in art materials," a project that staff estimated "would 
have cost in excess of $25,000" had CPSC "contracted for this work." CPSC Study, supra note 
214, at 2. 
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Against this backdrop of cost efficiency and financial responsibility, even 
the more compelling charges leveled at participant reimbursement seem less 
significant. At limited expense, the administrative sector has acquired experi-
ence with a promising mechanism for generating information and shaping 
perspectives and from which it has reaped demonstrable, though not unequiv-
ocal, benefit in specific proceedings. 
D. Experience, Experiment, and Reimbursement Authority 
While participant compensation has demonstrated promise, the concept 
is not equally beneficial in all administrative contexts.278 Selection proce-
dures, other operative techniques, resource outlay, and even the advisability 
of reimbursement itself may vary from agency to agency. Extensive and more 
rigorous study is needed to review the course of the funding programs, to 
explore ways of enhancing their effectiveness, and to identify those circum-
stances in which compensation is likely to be of greatest benefit.279 Indepen-
dent, expert evaluation,280 with defined impact parameters,281 conducted for a 
sufficient period, will be needed for definitive assessment of program per-
formance. Pending such comprehensive analysis, and perhaps postponing it 
until more experience accumulates, the reimbursement experiment should 
continue. 
Because the optimal conditions for funding of participants have yet to be 
identified, it is logical to explore the compensation concept with a maximum 
degree of flexibility and opportunity for administrative innovation. Compre-
hensive legislative guidance is not only improbable and difficult to provide; it 
also may be unnecessary at this point. Congress should continue specifically 
authorized reimbursement programs on a selective basis, maintaining those 
that have improved decisionmaking and have been well administered, and 
should support institution of programs in agencies that may especially benefit 
from funded involvement. 282 Congress should refrain from imposing restric-
tions on participant compensation through the appropriations process.283 
278. FrC Chairman Collier, in the context of testifying that "funded participation substan-
tially benefits the proceedings," observed that "not all projects have been equally successful," as 
"might easily have been expected." H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500-01. 
279. In identifying circumstances that might auger well for a successful compensation pro-
gram, consideration should be accorded to factors such as the type of agency, the type of 
proceedings, the type of issues presented for resolution, and the type of contribution to be made. 
280. See Rosenbaum, supra note 200, at 42. 
281. For example, Professor Rosenbaum offers a "rudimentary impact model," which 
divides the "policy goals for citizen participation into three broad categories: those relating to 
policy makers, substantive policy decisions themselves and the procedures for making policy," 
and indicates that "there may also be 'spillovers.' " Id. at 35-36. It bears repeating, however, 
that the relative efficacy of reimbursed involvement is a function of many variables, and that any 
analysis must necessarily be polycentric. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394-404 (1978). 
282. Reimbursed public involvement in the CPSC "offeror" process, though recently elimi-
nated see supra note 90, appears to have offered many advantages, see CPSC Study, supra note 
214, and the CAB experiment seems to have been quite promising, see CAB study, supra note 201. 
283. See supra notes 82-85 & 90 and accompanying text. 
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If this guidance were followeq; the implied reimbursement. principle 
would afford sufficient flexibility for additional experimentation, Assuming 
agencies' existing legislative mandates are br.oad enough to satisfy the implied· 
funding rationale, the agencies themselves can best determine whether· com-. 
pensation has the potential to enhance their decisionmaking and if the pro-
jected benefits justify divertjng agency resources. The collective exercise_ of 
administrative discretion probably would result in moderately scaled, diverse 
programs, supporting participant input of varied content and quality. These 
programs should facilitate additio..nal testing and refinement. of the reimburse-
ment concept without committing._ the government to any fixed mode. 284 
So long as the funding efforts are modest and responsibly managed,. 
contribute to the decisional process, and do not interfere with accomplish-
ment of traditional agency responsibilities, Congress and the courts should be 
receptive to these experiments. Judges should prohibit programs instituted 
pursuant to implied power only where the compensation effort tjolates the 
general tenor of the particular agency's statutory mandate, either because 
that mandate has been drawn narrowly by Congress or because the program 
is so insubstantial or so valueless that it contravenes sound administi:ative 
policy. Proscribing agency initiatives on the basis of analogies to fee shifting 
or ambiguous legislative expressions, however, is unwarranted. Statutory 
authority and the existing administrative structure are sufficiently exp~nsive 
to accommodate reimbursement pursuant to implied agency power. The 
funds earmarked for compensation are spent in the public interest and for the 
public benefit. The information and experience acquired promise advantages 
for the individual agencies today and for the functioning of the entire ~dmin­
istrative sector in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Five years of agency experimentation w~th participant funding have. 
shown the concept to be a valuable and cost-effective means of improving 
administrative decisionmaking. Unfortunately, that exploration has virtually 
been ended by judicial interpretation, antiregulatory reaction, budget-cutting, 
and bureaucratic caution. If Congress and the present Administration have 
correctly perceived that part of what is wrong with government regulation is 
agency unresponsiveness to the needs of the American people, their negative 
approach to the reimbursement concept is ironic. Rather than being elimi.,, 
nated, this promising, inexpensive mechanism for improving administrative 
decisions by making agencies more responsive should be expanded and re-
fined. 
284. It would be especially unwise for Congress to adopt legislation expressly proscribing 
agency reimbursement "unless specifically authorized by law," like the bill approved by the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1981 and the full Senate in 1982 and by the House 
Judiciary Committee in 1980. See generally supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text. 
Of course, such action would eliminate the flexibility needed by agencies to experiment with 
funding. It also will be less expensive to permit agencies to compensate public participants 
pursuant to implied authority when the agencies deem funded involvement necessary to the 
decisional process, rather than to require that individual agencies secure congressional permission 
every time one of them desires to reimburse participants. 
